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# SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Official Journal of the Society for the Study of Social Problems

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# SOCIOLOGISTS IN AN INTEGRATING SOCIETY: SIGNIFICANCE AND SATISFACTION IN SOCIOLOGICAL WORK\*

ALFRED McCLUNG LEE

Brooklyn College

What are the intellectual opportunities sociology offers us today? We all have to start wherever we can in such a field — as interviewers, data processors, paper graders, IBM jockeys, or junior "members" of research "teams," or perhaps more happily as subsidized graduate students or rookie college teachers. Then we have to continue to support ourselves as best we can. But what intellectual adventures can those of us now find who enter sociology as a scientific career and not merely as an avenue to a secure academic post or as a step in upward mobility toward managerial respectability?

This question is likely to remain pertinent and even pressing for many years to come.

A year ago at Berkeley, California, Samuel A. Stouffer in his presidential address before the American Sociological Society, discussed similar questions, but his analysis of opportunities differs from mine in crucial respects. He saw the future of our field — an eventual "Malthusian upswing of sociology" — as depending primarily upon technical inventions, that is, upon better measurement gadgetry. He omitted from his discussion, as he said, "entirely broad realms of description and analysis which are richly productive for sociology though not involving measurement." (12) Possibly this

is why he spoke of technical and sociological inventions and discounted the significance of discoveries.

Stouffer discussed a series of investigations in which measurement techniques play parts. In fact, the investigations mentioned are largely exercises in the use of such techniques. Possibly this is why he made no apparent distinction between what he called sociological inventions and inventions of measurement gadgets. At any rate, he wound up with welcoming young sociologists to what he spoke of as "a brave new world."

Stouffer's context made his "new world" bear some startling resemblances to the one in Aldous Huxley's science fiction, *Brave New World* (1932). And as Huxley observes in a 1946 foreword to an edition of his novel, "The most important Manhattan Projects of the future will be vast government-sponsored enquiries into what politicians and the participating scientists will call 'the problem of happiness' — in other words, the problem of making people love their servitude." (4, p. xv quoted)

Problems implicit in Stouffer's paper and explicit in Huxley's novel are these: Can science and especially — for our purposes — social science still occasionally be the brash, young, vital, productive, unsettling, even revolutionary pursuit it has been in its most valuable periods? Or must it become more and more socialized — hemmed in with orthodox views and procedures in institutionalized settings? Because of the magnitude

\*Address as President of the Society for the Study of Social Problems before a joint meeting of that Society, the American Sociological Society, and the Rural Sociological Society at Urbana, Illinois, September 8, 1954.

of modern investigative and experimental operations, isn't the independent and individualistic social scientist obsolete? Because only highly trained specialists can know enough about a field to indicate adequately how to utilize its theories, for whom are such expensive technicians to work? Must the work of scientists inevitably produce primarily a technology that only managers of large enterprises can use? What are the optimum conditions under which a scientist can do sociological research?

This paper deals with these questions in terms of the principal kinds of contributions sociologists are now making in our very tense American and world society, which is experiencing such painful evidences of both contraction in expanse and integration in organization. These contributions may be listed under five headings: 1. trivia, as always and in quantity, 2. technology for management and manipulation, 3. criticisms and proposed modifications of public policy, 4. sociology for liberal education, and 5. sociology for everyman. Some may question why this list does not include a heading something like "pure sociology." In my estimation, to be sociological, theory has to have close reciprocal interrelations with first-hand investigations of social phenomena.

Outstanding contributions to the last three of these five — to public policy, for liberal education, and for everyman — constitute in my opinion practically all the worthwhile sociological literature we have, but the first two — trivia and technology — have today the greatest bulk by long odds.

Let us look briefly at ventures in these five areas, including the high intellectual adventures sociologists have had and can continue to have in the last three of them:

1. *Trivia*. This topic is for academic completeness and for brushing aside, but it cannot be ignored. "Not philosophers but fret-sawyers and stamp collectors compose the backbone of society," says Aldous Huxley. (4, p. 2) And so it is also with those who call themselves the scientists of human relationships. Blessed today are those of slight curiosity, no courage, and a penchant for ritual, for our profession provides many ways for them to achieve a respectable status without prying into controversial matters, the only matters likely to concern a scientifically motivated sociologist.

To be sure, the trivia-makers have a ready justification for the moral in consequence and the human irrelevance of their products. They look upon themselves as "the hod-carriers of science." But I am not calling all hard-working hod-carriers trivia-makers. I am referring to the ritualistic hod-carriers, those who go through elaborate and even elegant motions but carry no bricks. Our profession being what it is, an adherent of middle-class mores, it is ordinarily thought impolite to remark that an ornate hod is empty.

Sumner, Cooley, Park, and Vebelen grubbed for seminal ideas. They used the tools available and improved them as needed. But the writers of trivia are most often "approachers." They remind one of Abercrombie & Fitch hunters or of ardent fishermen who spend their spare time throughout the year creating artistic gems of craftsmanship in the form of trout flies and split bamboo rods. They also remind one of certain college and university presidents who look upon an athletic building, a beautiful library facade, or a highly visible cyclotron as their chief showpiece. The sociological approachers expend endless research grants and fill many volumes on

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refinements of semantics, methodology, and theory which — like the fisherman-craftsman's gallery of gorgeous dry flies — are for the purpose of painless but conspicuous distinction rather than production.

Another satisfying way to rationalize the manufacture of trivia is to accept such a narrow and desiccated definition of "scientist" as that which George A. Lundberg (9) sponsors, has many times hotly defended, and frequently does *not* follow in those of his writings which he apparently regards as "scientific." This definition stresses proper means — "instruments of precision" — rather than problems, approaches rather than the study of phenomena. As A. H. Maslow has pointed out, definition and refinement of proper methods for science often lead "to voluntarily imposed self-limitations, to abdication from huge areas of human interest," in short to that contradiction of terms, a "scientific orthodoxy." (10)

From an emphasis on validity, these methodological purists move on to contend that scientists should not call their conclusions "scientific" short of near certainty. Especially on publicly controversial matters do they insist upon silence until they are overwhelmed with evidence, evidence they themselves often will not collect. And so they make available to themselves a most protective negativism. This handy negativism, especially when aligned with the prejudices of those with power, gives them an illusion of dispassionate courage. It glosses over the unconnectedness, insignificance, and irrelevance of so many of their items.

2. *Technology*, The major managers and manipulators of our society have problems on which they now have come to think that sociologists can be put to some use. Statistical technicians and sociological engineers become media

through whom the prestige of sociology as a science can be brought to bear upon problems of industry, government, churches, and civic organizations. Persons functioning as technicians — not as scientists — in mass-communications, public opinion surveying, group dynamics, social organization, social welfare, industrial sociology, and the like are put to work converting otherwise socially unpalatable sociological theories into presumably workable techniques which they can merchandise. Thus do strange terms and disturbing ideas degenerate into clichés and form the bases for saleable gimmicks.

As in other fields, sociologists are called "scientists" whether or not they are interested in pursuing scientific investigations. This blankets under the one label industrial engineers, technicians, specialists in teaching, administrators, do-gooders, and do-badders as well as qualified sociological scientists. Trivia-makers and neopositivist social engineers frequently fret in print about being grouped with do-gooders, but the confusion has its unintended merits. It permits a degree of useful mobility within the profession. Scientific researchers and professors lend an academic authority to engineers and technicians. Engineers and technicians and administrators in turn have acquired the respectability of usefulness to the powerful in our anti-deviationist society. They therefore willy-nilly provide respectability among power-seekers for sociologists as a whole and hence a protective covering for scientists. In addition, under the leadership of *Fortune* and a few other periodicals and through liberal arts education, more of our men of affairs are coming to understand their own and society's gains from putting up with undependable and disturbing physical,

biological, and social scientists. Whatever harm comes to the development of scientific sociology from the over-weening claims of commercial market researchers, opinion analysts, personnel manipulators, and their fellows is in part counteracted by their plugging the term sociology.

But problems arise in the relations between sociological scientists and the engineers chiefly within our colleges and universities. These problems concern the involvement of faculties and students of liberal arts colleges and graduate schools in special-interest social engineering projects. As William H. Whyte, Jr., observes in *Fortune*, "The more quickly our bureaucracies grasp at the new 'tools' of persuasion, the more will the legitimate social scientist be pressured for 'practical results.' Those who would indulge in pure inquiry instead would find themselves 'deviants' from the integrated society they helped to fashion; only as lackeys would they have a function. In sheer self-defense, if nothing else, the social scientist must keep an eye on ethics." (13, 14; 13, p. 91 quoted)

Rationalizations for converting sociological graduate departments into social engineering institutes become rather precious and at times downright cynical. The principal contentions are as follows: Outside subsidies from special interests make it possible to finance the expensive research now "necessary" for the "development of sociology." Even though the immediate problems of such projects are technological rather than scientific, the findings do bear upon more "basic scientific problems." Donors pay for engineering, and they get what they pay for; but the faculties also get data related to their "scientific interests" as well as facilities with which to train graduate students in big-

time procedures "essential" to current sociological research. But instances have already piled up that do not bear out this line of reasoning.

Let us look at a typical intellectual misadventure for which academic social engineers are currently asking support. It is a proposed series of investigations to determine how to carry on research itself more efficiently in an organizational or "team" setting. The proposal for the program (5) quotes a "prominent research executive" as follows: "We must know what we want and what we expect of the research worker. We must understand his motivations and characteristics. Based on our understanding of these things, we must provide environments conducive to good results. We must use creative imagination in the administration of research. We must follow this by sound engineering and good business planning. This is effective research. This is the kind of research which means position and control of destiny tomorrow." (3) To these ideas, which sound so much more like those of industrial managers or advertising hucksters than anything worth being associated with sociology, the academic social research institute says amen in these words: "It is toward such goals that the following proposal is directed."

In this project as in other social engineering projects which I have examined, certain rigid ideological conditions are set at the beginning that define areas within which facts are gathered; these conditions in effect command certain conclusions. A much more fundamental problem than that stated is whether or not scientists can best do scientific work under a research administrator and as part of an organization consisting of one or more "teams." Even more fundamental is the question: How

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does creative scientific work take place? For that matter, how does creative work of any kind take place? By what sorts of people? Under what kinds of conditions?

Is it any wonder that academic social engineers take on the cult-like characteristics so common among business technicians, with security found in a hierarchy, a full-blown "company" ideology, a patter, a few well-worn techniques and gadgets, and a narrow routine of life? Daniel Bell notes the pride these folks exhibit in what they call "strictly empirical research" with its "formidable statistical apparatus," and he adds, "Yet while researchers in this field often display a parvenu arrogance toward theory, a great deal of pretentious, senseless, and extravagant writing fills their own work, much of it inspired by the theoretical system they have taken over from Pareto." (1)

The technicians' ideology typically accepts a depersonalized view of less fortunate humanity. As Bell observes, "The belief in man as an end in himself has been ground under by the machine, and the social science of the factory researchers is not a science of man, but a cow-sociology." He quotes Burleigh Gardner as follows: "The more satisfied [the worker] is, the greater will be his self-esteem, the more content will he be, and therefore, the more efficient in what he is doing." How reminiscent again of Huxley's *Brave New World*! As Whyte concludes, social engineering "is profoundly authoritarian in its implications, for it subordinates the individual to the group" and provides "a highly appealing rationale for conformity." (13, p. 88)

Sociological researchers and theorists have begun to develop, as one of their major products, a technology which engineers and technicians are placing at the service

of special interests with little or no regard for broader interests. But sociologists are also needed as scientists. Those who become lackeys do not remain scientists. Thus in our academic sociology we have the same confusion between discovering the new and putting across the old that is having such devastating effects in the other physical, biological, and social sciences.

Let us now turn to the areas of high adventure in sociology — public policy, liberal education, and everyman's social ideas.

3. *Public Policy.* The "fathers" of American sociology, for example Sumner, were social critics who attempted to clarify issues and to propose modifications in aspects of on-going human society. The products of contemporary sociologists relevant to public policy self-consciously avoid the polemic tone of Sumner's earlier work. They also seldom reveal his depth of informed insight into human affairs. But sociologists today do write papers and books on problems of broad concern — intergroup relations, mass-communications, community organization, the socialization of the individual, conformity and non-conformity, marital adjustments, influences of housing on the routines of life, social stratification. These works are variously quoted and interpreted by sociologists and others in their roles as consultants, expert witnesses, speakers, committee members, judges, administrators, and legislators. Even more powerfully, these works are used in education and thus influence policy-making through modifying culture.

Mass-communications and intergroup relations illustrate the failure and success of sociologists in contributing to public policy formation in recent decades.

In mass-communications, a few social scientists and other students

of public affairs have seen and analyzed dangers inherent in the powerful drive over the years towards the integration of our press, radio, and now television media under fewer and fewer like-minded executives. Hearings before the Federal Communications Commission on press-radio relations in 1941, the case of the United States of America *versus* The Associated Press and others in 1942-45, concerning the AP's monopolistic role, and the reports of the Luce Commission on Freedom of the Press (8) in 1947 were important phases in public discussion and decision-making concerning this trend. Both the Federal Communications Commission (6) and the Federal Courts (7) admitted sociological evidence pro and con given by sociologists. This evidence set forth analyses of press statistics and other relevant facts and interpreted the probable consequences of the monopolistic trend.

Lofty statesmanship and a lack of relevant new facts on threats to press freedom blunted the impact of the Luce Commission's report. The prestige of the Commission's membership helped to stir discussion, but its proposals gained no acceptance.

Those concerned with the restriction of competition in communications lost in all three instances. The F.C.C. slurred over the issue of press-radio integration and muddled along without an actual policy on the granting of radio station licenses directly or by transfer to newspaper owners. As a result, joint press-radio control of the dominant outlets increased. Oddly enough, even though the Federal government won the AP case in the U.S. Supreme Court, the result was much the same after a short time as if the AP had won. This was the famous "Marshall Field case" in behalf of the Chicago *Sun* and

other papers. By easing the rigidity of the AP's contractually established monopoly, the U.S. Supreme Court enabled the AP to become a more inclusive representative in newsgathering of the existing daily newspaper owners. So far as gains in variety of viewpoint in newsgathering or among daily newspapers were concerned, the continued decline in competition and the tight integration of daily newspapers into the American business community counteracted the victory. The AP decision registered only a few quite temporary gains in competition of ideas and of versions of the news.

The intergroup relations situation is strikingly different and for a basic reason. Sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists have educated many thousands of college students with regard to race, interethnic relations, and other aspects of intergroup relations. This educational work is one of our greatest accomplishments, but we have not done nearly so much work on the growing pall of orthodoxy in mass-communications, and we generally give much less attention to it in college texts. Our researchers have done more to solve technical problems in psychological warfare and for advertising and public relations purposes than to help students understand propaganda and other aspects of social manipulation which directly bear upon them. In other words, we have done more as a profession to promote than to dispel the growing pall of orthodoxy.

Kenneth B. Clark and his associates (2) for the first time had social psychological findings of sociologists and psychologists admitted as evidence and used as the major basis for decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. The educational work done by social scientists over the years since 1896 provided the foundation for the elimin-

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ation of the Plessy "separate but equal" doctrine. This reference to historical preparation is not meant to belittle the hard-won accomplishment of Clark and his associates but to help place it in longer perspective. As James Reston commented in the *New York Times*, the "court's opinion read more like an expert paper on sociology than a Supreme Court opinion." (11) These high court decisions constitute a degree of policymaking success beyond anything previously achieved by sociologists in public affairs in this country.

From this it should now be clear that sociological findings make their greatest impact upon public policy when they are simultaneously moving through policymaking, educational, and popular channels. Such findings do not arise from little social engineering manipulations. On the contrary they come from wrestling with major issues of human existence.

Here are some other questions of public policy with which sociologists should now deal: How can society best adjust itself to psychological deviants — criminal, sexual, deficient, and other? Is police brutality inevitable, something the busy and anxious world cannot help but permit the defenseless to suffer, or can the police gain a new and more mature understanding of their social responsibilities? What about the growing atomism and anonymity of urban life? Can we have community planning for living and not just for architectural effects? How can we achieve more satisfactory marriage and divorce patterns? Can lonely men and women of the mid - twentieth century learn enough about propaganda and social manipulation so that they can take active and useful roles in their community's political and social life? Must the "brave new world" toward which our en-

gineers so joyfully and thoughtlessly help to push us be like Huxley's and Orwell's? What about anti-intellectualism? How cultish must intellectuals be? How can sociologists contribute more to international understanding?

These questions suggest a few major policy areas in which sociological research can make contributions and is now to some extent active. If we would devote less of our efforts to fancy methodological footwork and dehumanized engineering and more to these great human concerns, sociology would be less likely to fall in this country into the formalism to which our German colleagues have so frequently been prone.

Let us look now at sociological products which function even more directly to facilitate culture modifications.

4. *Liberal Education.* We present ourselves to students as having a better way to learn about society than through religious inspiration, mere speculation, and other types of special revelation. In doing so, we have three major duties to our general undergraduate students, three major products to offer them. These are: 1. an introduction to how sociologists contribute to knowledge, 2. an acquaintanceship with our major findings and with some typical studies, and 3. an understanding of how sociologists, as social scientists and as participants in Western culture, synthesize what they know about man in society. We assume the obligation to serve as higher critics of inherited social and moral philosophy, to help students to build socially relevant findings of scientists into their altering perspectives upon man in society and upon themselves in particular. In our field this obligation must be carried out in no small part by textbook writers.

Some of our colleagues, especial-



ly the ultra-empiricists and the trivia-writers, ape mathematicians and physicists in still another respect and treat textbook writers as beneath their lofty notice. Now many a textbook should be sneered at as an unhappy, half-baked jumble of folk wisdom, a middleclass version of morality, scientific pretentiousness, and a small amount of sociological findings. But at the same time, I would point out that a very large share of key works in sociology were written originally for liberal arts students to hear or read.

The lack I find in many contemporary textbooks is the integration which comes from long working and reworking of materials such as one finds in the writings of Sumner and Cooley and Park. This lack derives in part, in my estimation, from too few sociologists devoting themselves now to the formulation of sociological perspectives for college text purposes and for everyman. In texts, they now chiefly compile.

Let us now turn to my fifth and last point.

5. *Sociology for Everyman.* There are at least four ways to look at writing about sociology for a general audience. 1. You can insist that all sociology of any consequence is for specialists. It has to be written precisely, and only inaccurate re-interpretations can be presented to the general public. 2. You can say that sociology is much too complicated for interpretation below the level of college freshmen or sophomores. 3. You can say that it should be done, that it can be done, and then sit and wonder what in the world we have to say to everyman. Publishers inform me that any number of popular books about sociology have been unsuccessfully attempted. And finally 4. You can take the position of thoughtful professional writers for general audiences that

any major idea can be translated into simple enough English for the understanding at least of readers of *Time*, the *Atlantic Monthly*, and *The Saturday Review*. When you tell such writers that this popularization has rarely been attempted successfully in sociology, they try to raise embarrassing questions about whether or not sociologists have something of importance to say.

You can pick up fairly satisfactory popularizations of almost any scientific field except sociology. There are mathematics and political science and economics "for the millions." Biology and physics are available for "John Doe." Writers have turned out an endless array of interpretations of the human mind for persons with educational preparation ranging from a few grades upward. And our close associates, the anthropologists, notably Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, have their inexpensive pamphlets and pocketbooks on the nation's newsstands.

Just as important as books for popular enlightenment is the discussion of significant scientific issues, problems, and theories in thought-provoking general periodicals. Our invasions of this field are mainly superficial discussions of marital relations and crime. Sometimes we speak to non-technical audiences on housing, leisure-time activities, city planning, inter-group relations, or some other problem area. But basic sociological matters far more frequently reach general audiences through attacks on us by theologians and politicians who are not answered, or through novels or plays, than as direct and careful interpretations of sociological findings by sociologists. Such books as Lillian Smith's *Strange Fruit* (1944) and *Killers of the Dream* (1949) described to more people the nature of the American Negro, his yearn-

ings, and his problems than a large share of our elementary texts combined. Certain sociological Public Affairs Pamphlets are about as near as we have come to speaking to large general audiences.

Why is this? Is it at all related to the deep antagonism which apparently exists between so many sociologists and so many people concerned with *belles lettres*? Does it derive from the social indifference of so many sociologists and the antipathy of so many humanities specialists towards what they call dehumanized sociological theory? Popular critics at times speak contemptuously of sociologists as persons who only appear to be studying society but who actually are in flight from reality among their gadgets and methods.

Those of us who have fairly detailed knowledge of sociology and who have taught sections of introductory sociology and social problems know that there are basic theoretical issues and theories which fascinate freshmen and sophomores from other departments. What interests majors in business administration, education, and journalism is likely to interest at least fairly literate general audiences. I refer to such topics as societal, cultural, and personal relativity; discontinuities in age-roles; the class and caste structuring of society; the semi-autonomous nature of human groups; the strange characteristics of social distance, of attitudinal multivalence, and of morals-mores contrasts.

Of course the mere recitation of these topics immediately suggests possible reasons why sociology for everyman has been so slow in coming and why it has been achieved chiefly by indirect routes. The highly controversial nature of the topics drives many enticed into sociology into what they apparently regard as a self-protective shell.

But fear of audience reprisals and thoughts of strategy are enemies of science. An evidence that sociology is becoming mature will be the creation by leading members of the field of works so relevant to broad human concerns and needs that these works command interpretation in simple English.

Sociology thus, in my estimation, offers us greater opportunities today for intellectual adventure and contribution than ever before. These opportunities require firsthand knowledge of the arenas where both popular and special knowledge about humanity is most necessary. These arenas concern disciplines in addition to sociology; no scientific way of studying man is without its contribution to an understanding of human society. But as co-trustees of the liberal arts heritage in our colleges and of the social philosophical heritage of the West in our society, we need to keep our eyes and to encourage our students to keep their eyes trained upon the great problems and challenges of man's life in society. We may thus help to save ourselves and our science from Huxley's and Orwell's nightmares. We may thus help to forge a science which serves the needs of man rather than the aspirations of future tyrants. And in making our work useful to humanity, we will also make it more satisfying to ourselves.\*

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## THE IMPINGEMENT OF MORAL VALUES ON SOCIOLOGY\*

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For many sociologists the problem of the relationship of sociology to moral values has risen again in recent years; and the demands for a solution to the problem have become sharper. The need for moral courage in extreme situations presented by the events of recent

history has combined with the revival of the functional theory of moral values and religion to raise the non-scientific question in the minds of some as to the adequacy of the account of values presented by philosophical positivism. The moral character of sociology itself has been brought into question as it has been recognized that not only can social science be used by people with varying central values, but also that the modes of scienti-

\*A paper presented as part of the panel on "Value Biases in Sociology" at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems held in Urbana, Illinois, September, 1954.

fic procedure and the concepts of sociology seem frequently to conflict with moral values widely shared in our society. If moral values are more than illusions or subjective preferences whose integrating power is based simply on their being agreed upon rather than on their content, and if sociology itself can no longer be regarded simply as a morally neutral body of scientific knowledge, then it is time that we renew our concern with values. The existence of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, and of this panel under its auspices is witness, I believe, to this renewed concern.

The topic which has been assigned us, however, indicates a tendency to deal with the value problem through categories that have been used in the past and found wanting. The phrase, "Value Biases in Sociology," suggests that the problem is one of dealing with the intrusion of value propositions into a system of propositions that are supposed to be verifiable by empirical methods. It has been believed, justifiably, that such intrusion biases the empirically testable statements in such a way as to vitiate their scientific objectivity, validity, and reliability. The dominant reaction under this definition of the problem has been to reject such intrusion.

Since, in this view, the intrusion of value biases is regarded as the only mode of impingement of moral values on sociology, its rejection must be and has been accompanied by a denial of any close and intimate connection between values and sociology. (4) In the extreme instances of philosophical positivism it is denied that values have any objective validity, but exist solely as subjective preferences given spurious validity by the superempirical beliefs of those who hold the values. (1) Sociology from this stance is viewed as a

completely neutral body of empirical propositions having no connection with values except as a morally neutral instrument usable by people with all sorts of subjective preferences. \*Values do not enter into the gathering, conceptualization, and reporting of data, except as a pragmatic system of agreed upon rules defining the purposes and methods of science.

A few sociologists have believed that the problem of the relationship between sociology and moral values is not so easily solved, but they, too, have accepted the idea that the sole mode of impingement is that of the intrusion of value biases into the systematic body of empirical propositions. Rather than rejecting such intrusion, they have accepted it as inevitable and have called for the acknowledgment and explicit statement of the value biases that do enter into the discipline in this fashion. (5)

Neither of these positions is adequate. The minority reaction recognizes the intimate connection between moral values and social science, but by viewing that connection through the concept of bias, it renders impossible the development of sociology as an objective system of empirically verifiable propositions. The task of sociologists still is to build such a system, valid either for all social relations or for social relations within our culture. To accomplish this task the discipline must remain free from value judgments. not because such judgments are simply subjective preferences, but because the modes of cognition which they involve go beyond the capabilities of scientific method. It is true that value judgments should be made explicit and conscious, but this is for the purpose of excluding them from the body of scientific propositions.

\*"Science . . . an instrument which man may use under any organization for whatever ends he seeks." (4)

tions. To include them in the body of sociology is to introduce propositions which are not testable by empirical research. While applied research can be scientific if its value premises are fully stated and adhered to, its findings can be included in a general body of theory only if these premises are eliminated. To believe that value biases are an inevitable part of the body of social science, is to render that science impossible of development.

The majority point of view is in no better state, for while it saves sociology as a science, it divorces it from the value matrix in which it is located. Social science deals with relations among human beings; social scientists, themselves, establish social relations with the objects of their study in the process of studying them. Hence the findings of sociology will inevitably have implications for the moral norms which govern human relations; and the activities of the sociologists are subject to such governance. Neither the body of knowledge, nor the activities of its seekers are morally neutral. The sociological laws and concepts which conflict with the empirical conditions postulated at the base of a system of ultimate moral values are in conflict with the values themselves, and that conflict must be regarded seriously. It is the same when the procedures of social science conflict with the moral norms governing the social relations of human beings. To insist that the social scientist has met all his obligations when he has accepted the standards of scientific procedure, and that his findings are neutral with regard to moral values, is to deny the personal responsibility which each of us possesses as a participant in what is essentially a moral enterprise. Social science research is a human activity carried on within and re-

sponsible to the moral values which govern human life, and it is of necessity governed by the norms to which those ultimate values give rise.

What then are we to do, if we cannot accept the inevitability of including value biases in our science without destroying it as science, and cannot insist on the isolation of our discipline without destroying its morally responsible character? First, we must recognize and fully accept the dual character of the relationship between the sociologist and the people whom he studies. In the past we have recognized the relationship as a purely cognitive one existing between observer and observed. As such we have governed it with cognitive standards of truth seeking. The rules of scientific procedure are specialized cognitive standards governing the seeking of empirically verifiable truth. While we have sometimes disagreed on the ontological character of such standards, in general we have accepted them as binding on our scientific activities. It is now necessary that we see this relation as existing in a second dimension as one between the social scientist as a human being and the observed as a human being. As such it must be governed by the moral norms which regulate all such relationships. At the core of these values in our civilization is the belief that we are obligated to love one another. Because the word love has been sentimentalized in our culture, we have frequently substituted such terms as respect for human dignity or regard for the infinite importance of the person; but all these terms have ultimate roots in the Greek-Hebrew-Christian moral tradition, and perhaps it is time that we recover our older vocabulary. This ultimate value of love and the norms to which it gives rise are morally binding on the relationship

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between the social scientist and the object of his study, constituting that object essentially a subject. They take precedence over the purely cognitive standards and limit the degree to which the latter can shape our actual scientific procedure.

While scientific procedure calls for detachment, objectivity, and a willingness to experiment by manipulating the objects of observation, these must be modified by our supreme moral obligation to love. Thus our objectivity and detachment cannot be those of coldness, aloofness, and unconcern, but must be those of controlled concern for the people we study. We can treat people only temporarily as objects, and only then to the extent that it does not infringe upon their dignity as human beings. We cannot experiment on them without their consent and without regard to their welfare. We cannot lie to them concerning the nature and purposes of our studies and our interview questions. We cannot practice the deception of having people playing false roles without the awareness of those being observed. We cannot report our findings without concern for the consequences of such reporting on the lives of those we have studied. (2) We cannot apply our findings or allow others to apply them without determining first whether such application will increase the freedom and responsibility of those to whom they are to be applied. At every step of our activity we must recognize, then, that the standards of reaching and applying empirically testable truths apply only within the broader scope of the ethic of love. Particular circumstances may create an imperative need for the gaining or application of social knowledge which may injure some human beings, but in such cases we are faced with the tragic choice of greater and lesser

evils; and even in these cases the ideal norms apply and we must accept responsibility for the guilt incurred by violating them. Since this phase of the relationship between moral values and social science involves action, it may be necessary that the values be embodied in specific normative rules applying to the relationship between the scientist and the object of his observation, and that these rules be supported by sanctions.

The second thing that we must do is to examine our concepts and our principles in light of the fact that they affect the postulated empirical base of the moral norms governing the relationships of all human beings with one another. The use of purely scientific standards in formulating concepts and principles may and frequently does result in the development of ideas adequately accounting for our observations in the short run which deny the empirical basis of many of our highest values. For example, many social psychologists now employ a theory of human personality which makes it nothing but a point of convergence of biological heredity, social systems, and cultural systems. They believe in the reality of biological systems, social systems, and cultural systems and are opposed to the reduction of any one to the others, but they have lost sight of the psyche as a real dynamic system existing in its own right, emerging from the matrix of the biological, the social, and the cultural, and yet to some degree transcending that matrix. Extreme examples of such thinking are to be found in the writings of B. F. Skinner and Walter Coutu, but it tends to pervade almost all our social-psychological thinking. (6) Such a conception of human nature denies in principle the possibility of free choice and responsibility, hence the possibility of human freedom itself. Yet these

possibilities are postulated at the base of our whole system of moral values, and particularly at the base of our valuing of freedom. Man must be capable of freedom if freedom is to be a value. This does not mean that he is free under all conditions, but that freedom is a generic possibility and need of the human psyche. If the principle of parsimony actually requires — and I doubt seriously that in the long run it does — a theory of personality which conceives freedom as meaningless or impossible, we are morally obligated to override the principle in this instance. We are not so sure of our concepts, that we can ignore the threats which they sometimes pose for our values. If a conception such as this is finally forced upon us by an overwhelming mass of evidence which cannot be accounted for by a theory of personality which makes freedom a possibility, it will be time enough then to despair of our moral aspirations. Until that time it is our obligation to attempt to develop and test theories and concepts which are compatible with our ultimate values. (3) This obligation, unlike the ones which govern our activities as scientists in relation to others, is essentially one involving our conceptual thinking and our analysis of data. As such it cannot be incorporated into a system of ethics supported by sanctions, but must be a matter for the individual conscience of each of us.

In concluding I should like to point out that neither of the two tasks of relating ultimate moral values to sociology requires that we relinquish our quest for a body of empirically verifiable social theory free from value judgments. The moral norms to which we are responsible limit the procedures that we may use and the concepts

which we may responsibly formulate, but they do not enter as biased statements into our body of scientific propositions. Rather they exist as a milieu within which such a body of scientific theory can exist and have meaning. The answer to our problem is not to be found in passing off our values based on non-scientific cognition as scientific conclusions, but in accepting them as a framework within which we can carry on our task of building a social science.

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## THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL PATHOLOGISTS\*

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In considering the problem of value bias it is relevant to ask whether social pathologists generally incline toward any particular sort of social philosophy and, if so, whether their adherence to this system could constitute a threat to their scientific objectivity.

As a very modest attempt to throw some light on these questions, the present writer examined the first five issues of our official journal, *Social Problems*, for the presence of value postulates. Of course these five issues do not constitute a probability sample of the literature of social pathology. On the contrary, they constitute a highly selected sample; but the material is relevant to the present purpose precisely because it is selected, because it is material that has been judged significant enough to be published in the journal of the Society.

A value postulate of social pathology is defined as a judgment assigning a value to some social phenomenon, stating, for instance, that it is desirable or undesirable, something that should be encouraged or something that should be discouraged. Since they are postulates, such propositions are not proved within social pathology. The social pathologist simply takes them over from social philosophy without proof.

In the examination of the specified sample of literature, value postulates were identified in either of two ways. First, if a writer described a social phenomenon with value-laden adjectives, such as "unfortunate," "regrettable," "nor-

mal," or "healthy," then his description was considered to imply a favorable or unfavorable value postulate as the case might be. Secondly, if a writer proposed social action either to suppress or to encourage some social phenomenon, this, also, was considered to imply a value postulate. On these principles the mere objective description of, say, a lynching, no matter how gory the details, would not be taken to imply a value postulate; but a postulate would be implied if the writer called the affair "shocking" or advocated anti-lynching legislation.

When they were examined by the foregoing principles, 63 per cent of the journal articles were found to contain one or more value postulates. Taken together, these value postulates constituted a fairly comprehensive fragment of social philosophy. It was not a complete social philosophy, of course — the sample was too small for that — but it was nevertheless a social philosophy whose general character was clearly discernible. By paraphrasing the language of the journal articles and rearranging them a bit, it is possible to summarize this social philosophy as follows:

The reproduction of the biologically fit should be encouraged by a eugenics program in so far as this is feasible. The growing child should be shielded from whatever can be detrimental to his morals and personality. Pre-school centers are desirable and primary education should be compulsory. Child labor can be dangerous. Parent education is a good thing. It is well to try to detect and treat behavior disorders at an early age.

There should be good relations

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among the various groups that make up the community, for example, between Negroes and whites, between the educated and the uneducated, or between trailer folk and settled residents of a locality. "Good" relations are those marked by cooperation and confidence, not by mutual suspicions, hostilities, misunderstandings, and resentments. Interpersonal relations should be friendly and individualized, a sense of belonging should be encouraged in all, and no one should be stigmatized as inferior on account of his ethnic origin. Planned recreational programs are a desirable means for encouraging friendly and relaxed interpersonal relations.

Generally speaking, technological progress is a good thing; but the modern industrial system involves certain dangers that should be met by community action, for example, the dangers of excessive strain and fatigue, unemployment, and economic insecurity in old age. Economic pressure should not be used as a weapon against the worker. The standard of housing and nutrition should be raised.

The benefits of modern medicine should be available to all. In particular, the community should organize to secure the early diagnosis and adequate treatment of mental illness; and to such illness no social stigma should be attached. Frankness in the discussion of sex is desirable. Our traditional code of sex ethics needs revision; this does not mean that sexual promiscuity can be tolerated, but rather that the code needs to be revised in the direction of a more relaxed, less guilt-conscious attitude.

Government must not be arbitrary. In the interest of efficient government it is desirable to employ full-time, professionally trained personnel in administrative po-

sitions. Governmental planning for future development is also desirable. The social scientist should enjoy full freedom of teaching and research so that he can make his maximum contribution to the overall planning of society.

Thus far the list of value postulates has been presented. It is important to realize clearly that they are postulates and that they are not demonstrable by empirical science. Empirical science can study existing social phenomena, it can predict with reasonable probability what social phenomena will emerge from a given set of antecedents, but it is absolutely silent on the desirability or undesirability of social phenomena. To distinguish the desirable from the undesirable belongs to the realm of social philosophy.

It is important, also, to realize that the value postulates listed are not a random collection, but imply a definite social philosophy. In the analysis of less than 200 pages of material, too few postulates were available to describe this philosophy completely, but enough were available to identify it quite clearly. It is a philosophy perhaps most accurately called "humanitarianism." It places a great deal of emphasis on the dignity and worth of the human person. It condemns all cruelty and brutality. It demands for every man freedom to pursue happiness in his own way, provided he does not trespass on the equal freedom of his fellows. It is a reasonable philosophy, very critical of meaningless conventions and traditional social distinctions that lack a pragmatic basis. It is a kindly philosophy, tolerant of differences, more anxious to control by persuasion than by force. It is a secular philosophy, concerned with human welfare in this present existence and not taking sides on religious issues. Historically, it has

its roots in the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. (3) Since that time it has undergone a good many modifications and today it is not a completely unified and consistent philosophy. However, the term "humanitarianism" is still definite enough to characterize that which is most distinctive in the social philosophy of American social pathologists.

It is important, finally, to realize that the main tenets of this social philosophy, obvious as they may seem to most of us, are by no means obvious to everyone. There have been and there are, in other countries and in our own, many who argue for special privilege based on social class or ethnic origin, who believe that the punishment of the lawbreaker should be primarily vindictive rather than preventive or reformatory, who oppose all government regulation of the economic system, and who contradict many of the other value postulates of social pathologists. This is a point of extreme importance. The social philosophy of the social pathologists is not unrivaled. It is not unique. It is not obvious. It is only one of many alternative social philosophies.

Adherence to the values of a particular social philosophy is, of course, no proof of value bias. One can hold a value system firmly, and argue for it strongly, while remaining open-minded. The essential question in the present discussion is whether social pathologists do, as a matter of fact, preserve this open-mindedness. There can be no doubt that we profess to do so. Open-mindedness is part of our scientific code. Verbally at least, we uphold the right to differ, the right to defend unpopular value systems. Dr. Franz Adler has stated the conventional position accurately and persuasively. (1) He emphasized the advantages of

education in "a nonsectarian and not otherwise value-oriented college" where the student can hear different value systems defended by different teachers and choose for himself freely among them. He contrasted this value pluralism with the value monism of an institution which "officially teaches one specific set of values" and concluded that "value pluralism is one of the few good things in our otherwise more than questionable system of higher education."

In general, are social pathologists willing to apply the principle of value pluralism wholeheartedly in their academic policies, following out the implications of the system to their logical conclusion? This question cannot be answered categorically, but it deserves some discussion. To see the question in its proper perspective, it may be helpful to consider a couple of hypothetical cases.

First, would any of us be willing to hire a sociologist who accepted the social philosophy and the value system of the Ku Klux Klan? Imagine him as a brilliant researcher, meticulously careful in his techniques, but always guided in his choice of problems and in the interpretation of his results by his characteristic philosophy. Imagine him as a clever and popular teacher, scrupulously accurate in his presentation of facts, but persuasively preaching his conviction that an elite of Old American stock should rule the country. In short, imagine him as an ideal faculty member in every way except that he frankly rejected the value system of humanitarianism in favor of another value system which is, after all, the system of a great many of our fellow Americans. How many would carry value pluralism to the point of hiring such a teacher?

Then consider a still more



delicate point. A comfortable majority of the citizens of the United States are members of some Christian denomination and profess belief in some form of Christian theology. A good many of these believers would criticize the philosophy of humanitarianism not for what it contains, but for what it omits. Whereas humanitarianism is oriented toward the pursuit of happiness in this life, Christianity traditionally teaches that the chief purpose of human activity should be the attainment of happiness in the life to come. The social philosophy of Christianity may agree with the social philosophy of humanitarianism on a good many concrete issues, but the two philosophies differ fundamentally in their conceptions of the ultimate purpose of human society. Would a teacher be accepted in a nonsectarian college if he frankly rejected the values of humanitarianism in favor of the more inclusive value system of some specific Christian theology? Probably the answer to this question is given by the adjective "nonsectarian" itself.

Whether they realize it or not, sociologists have a good many informal controls to keep the dissident in line. In the first place a prospective graduate student would not be likely to apply for admission into one of our departments unless he found the atmosphere of sociology congenial. It is not an atmosphere which a Ku-Kluxer, for example, would enjoy. In the graduate school, no matter how freely faculty members tolerate dissident views, their prestige is likely to have some influence on the opinions and value systems of the students. If the student has not completely accepted the conventional value system of his field by the time he receives his doctorate, he has still another hurdle before him. Who will hire the new

Ph.D. whose personal value system is notoriously out of line? Sociologists give much more than lip service to the ideal of value pluralism, but a department head must solve a real ethical problem before he hires a new instructor who will teach a social philosophy which he, the department head, considers socially pernicious. **Must** he be broad-minded enough to hire a Ku-Kluxer?

In a thoughtful article in our journal Dr. Mabel Elliott pointed out various pressures that may limit the freedom of research and mentioned, among other things, the limitations imposed on "those Catholic textbook writers who present sociological theory within a framework of acceptable theological doctrine." (2) Dr. Elliott is correct when she asserts that certain limitations are imposed on teachers in Catholic institutions. But is the situation essentially different at a state university? Is it not true that at the one place as at the other there is a range of permissible opinion with a relative or absolute tabu on opinions beyond that range?

At the average Catholic institution or state university, a teacher may be pro-labor or anti-labor; he may oppose socialized medicine or advocate it; he may freely take his stand on either side of a hundred controversial questions without fear of interference. But in either type of institution the teacher who would be violently anti-Negro or anti-Semitic or who would teach a savagely retaliatory theory of punishment in his criminology classes would be rather likely to run into difficulties. He would probably not be called on the carpet by his Dean and threatened with dismissal unless he changed his views, but he would be subject to a good many informal social pressures. He would

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be distrusted, perhaps cold-shouldered, by his colleagues. The life of the dissident can become inconspicuously miserable. Finally there are certain absolute tabus. In a Catholic college no one can teach what is directly opposed to Catholic doctrine. But state universities have their tabus also, do they not? To what extent are their teachers free to teach a value system based on the theology of a particular church? Indeed it seems to be a consequence of the doctrine of the extreme separation of church and state that teachers in state universities live under a rather severe tabu against the teaching of theological propositions.

The conclusion of this paper is that the question of value pluralism and value monism is much more complex than Dr. Adler and Dr. Elliott seem to realize. Social pathologists in general tend to hold value postulates related to a humanitarian philosophy and it is a question whether they are very tolerant of attacks on the fundamental values of this system. In

addition to these humanitarian values there are values derived from Christian theology which teachers in Catholic colleges are not free to oppose and teachers in state universities are not free to inculcate. The foregoing is the region of value monism. Beyond it there is a region of value pluralism in which we all may wander at will without incurring the displeasure of our colleagues; but it is a rather limited region, much more limited than most social pathologists seem to realize.

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## SOCIAL TENSIONS AND THE INHIBITION OF THOUGHT\*

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Social tensions such as those with which we have been faced for the past few decades originate in the structure of society as a whole. These structures are shaped, in the ultimate analysis, by historical, economic, sociological

and political factors. Since in turn all these forces depend on psychological processes for their mediation, it is obvious that psychological dynamics play into the resulting course of events.

The aid of psychology is indispensable in the elucidation of compensatory and distortive social trends such as those prompted by tension and fear. In the face of

\*Paper read at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems held in Berkeley, California, August 29-September 1, 1953.

concrete psychological evidence, which is continually accumulating, it would be extremely difficult to shut one's eyes to the fact that irrationality and the ensuing distortion of perception and projection of hostility as well as of other thwarted tendencies enters, during times of tension, the social and political scene in an incisive fashion. Some of this evidence is to be surveyed later in this paper. Irrationality and all of its manifestations, although more prominent under certain specified historical and socio-economic conditions, cannot be explained within the framework of such conditions alone; it must be viewed, in addition, from a psychological point of view.

Recent events have highlighted the well-known psychological fact that individuals, when faced with traumatic events of an overwhelming and unintelligible nature, are more prone to give up their mature and realistic ways of coping with difficulties and to resort to more immature patterns of reaction. Such so-called regression is by no means the only way of dealing with complex and anxiety-inducing situations. But since it is a frequent type of reaction, going in the direction of minimum effort, we shall first analyze this pattern of reaction. Later we shall turn to the more positive and constructive and, at the same time, more realistic ways of counteracting threatening situations.

One of the most crucial psychological aspects of international tensions and of the defensive and controlling measures which are apt to accompany any threat to national security is given by the inhibitory effects they may exert upon independent and critical judgment. We must therefore pay special attention to this problem. Experimental and clinical observation of adolescents who either

grew up in an atmosphere of tension or were experimentally exposed to frustrations permitted me to study in slow motion the effects of such threats upon thinking. By means such as these we may hope to understand better the analogous processes in the social and political area.

The cognitive syndrome which the adolescents studied were found to display what I have proposed to call "intolerance of ambiguity." Ambiguity as referred to here has nothing to do with confusion or inarticulate vagueness. On the contrary, it must be seen as the basis of flexibility, creativeness and imagination. Intolerance of ambiguity, by contrast, is characterized by the presence of a rigid cognitive superstructure in which everything opaque and complex is avoided as much as possible, and which obviously purports to compensate, if in the end unsuccessfully, for the inequities of the fear- and conflict-ridden emotional under-structure. The inharmonious nature of this double layer pattern is revealed in many of the following specific aspects of intolerance of ambiguity which deserve special mention, such as: the tendency toward unqualified, black-white and either-or solutions; other forms of over-simplified dichotomizing, stereotype, perseveration and mechanical repetition of sets and of faulty hypotheses; compartmentalization and piecemeal approach; quest for unqualified certainty as accomplished by pedantic narrowing of meanings, by stress on familiarity, by inaccessibility to new experience or by a segmentary randomness and an absolutizing of those aspects of reality which have been preserved; premature closure and definiteness achieved either by diffuseness and sterile rumination or by restriction to concrete and unessential detail; satisfaction with

subjective yet unimaginative, over-concrete or over-generalized solutions. There is the danger that propaganda may take advantage of this syndrome by the use of generalities combined with reference to unessential concrete details.

The subtle but profound distortion of reality which is the result of the elimination of ambiguities is, in the last analysis, precipitated by the fact that stereotypical categorization can never do justice to all the possible aspects of reality. Thus there is reluctance to give up what had seemed certain, a tendency not to see what does not harmonize with an earlier bias; assumptions once made, even though proved faulty and out of keeping with reality, tend to be repeated over and over and not to be corrected in the face of new evidence.

It must be granted that these various forms of rigidity and avoidance of ambiguity might, for a time, reduce anxiety. But whenever differentiation and adaptability to change are required, this adjustment will run the risk of breaking down. The same individuals who tend to display this rigid and perseverative, overly-cautious approach to thinking tend also towards impulsive, chaotic and confused behavior once the task becomes more difficult. Both of these ways of responding represent efforts to avoid uncertainty, one by fixation to, the other by breaking away from, the given realities.

Dramatized, concrete and at the same time global, diffuse and undifferentiated types of thinking are well-known characteristics of early developmental stages as such. However, the atmosphere in the home determines whether such primitive reactions become fixated or whether progress toward higher developmental stages can take place. For this latter course a re-

duction of fear, greater relaxation, acceptance of spontaneity and autonomy, and tolerance of insecurity and uncertainty are necessary requirements. Realism and creative cognitive penetration presuppose advances of this kind in general psychological maturity.

Anxiety-inducing social and political situations may bring to the fore the irrational elements that lurk behind the feeling of helplessness regardless of how permissive the original family situation might have been. In this manner political and social institutions have a direct bearing upon the emotional and cognitive outlook. The effects upon the thinking and creativity of adults under conditions of social and political over-control are probably quite analogous to those which are apparent in the growing child under the intimidating, punitive and paralyzing influence of an over-disciplined, authoritarian home atmosphere.

There can, however, be no doubt—and we shall come to this point later—that different personality structures do react differently to external pressures. But at the same time we must be aware of the fact that tensions and pressures are not only likely to bring authoritarian personalities to the fore but to reinforce authoritarian trends in individuals who otherwise would remain democratic-minded.

Fearful and frightened individuals have a tendency toward total, seemingly unquestioning surrender to every manner of authority; yet upon probing into the depth layer this surrender invariably proves profoundly ambivalent. The same rigid surface-conformity is exercised towards accepted standards of behavior even though the standards may sometimes be unwritten and those of a small ingroup. And this kind of conformity is accompanied by an unrealistic

and punitive condemnation of those who deviate from such norms.

The compulsive type of conformity just described, with its all-or-none character, differs in important respects from genuine and constructive conformity. First, it is excessive because it compensates for feelings of uncertainty and the attendant fear of becoming an outcast, and because it often serves the function of covering up the underlying resentment towards the social system as a whole, unconscious though this resentment may be.

A second characteristic of the compulsive conformist is given by his tendency to distort and simplify the system of norms and commands in the direction of what one may call unidimensional interpretation. Rules are adopted or enforced which are largely non-functional caricatures of our social institutions, based as they are on a misunderstanding of the ultimate intent of these institutions. In many ways one may even speak of a defiance of an existing culture by compulsive external conformity to its rules. By virtue of the distortions of the spirit of existing institutions, compulsive conformity in certain ways constitutes a form of subversion.

The absence of a genuine incorporation of the values of society accounts for the rigidity of the conformity; at the same time it accounts for a certain unreliability, a readiness to shift allegiance suddenly and completely to other, sometimes diametrically opposite, authorities or standards. This unreliability is a third characteristic of the compulsive conformist. It is out of anxiety that he adheres to the familiar and the unquestioned; it is out of the same anxiety that he readily turns against the very society the values of which he has never espoused

with more than a divided heart. He pays very little attention to the social and political realities involved but follows the lure of a few slogans, especially when these are cast in the dichotomies of which we have spoken above.

Let me now turn to the possible implications of this picture upon the situation created by the continued international tensions of the present. One possible outcome could be a profound transformation of our society through the eventual emergence of what Laswell has called the "garrison police state" in which power is concentrated in a small group and the community is strictly regimented in the name of common defense.

Orwell has given a vivid and uninviting description of such a state in operation. The psychological end-stages of such a development could be intellectual surrender, a craving for unrealistically absolute and definite answers, and a search for leaders whose aura of strength, power and glory seems to afford surcease from feelings of isolation, frustration and helplessness, and whose doctrines seem to provide an all-embracing answer to the conflicts and confusions of life and relief from the burdens of self-determination. Thus just those states would be brought about which we set out to combat in our democratic society.

Examples of apodictic and non-rational systems are given by the economic and social doctrines of both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Though the two differ in many particulars, both offer an essentially unscientific metaphysical, all-inclusive "Weltanschauung" which has the appearance of definiteness. The solutions are presented in a dogmatic, absolutistic and often inarticulate and unintelligible way and are formulated for the explicit purpose of by-passing



the processes of reasonable consideration.

It must be noted that under such regimes free inquiry and thought is stifled not only in the touchy domain of the social sciences and psychology. The crippling effects readily extend to such seemingly remote domains as theory construction in physics. We have witnessed this in the official rejection of the system of Einstein on the part of both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, a reaction which could not but have an inhibitory effect on the creative imagination of individual scientists as well. The Nazi psychologist Jaensch accused Einstein of dissolving reality, and the Communists accused Einstein of idealism.

Essentially the two accusations are very similar. Both involve the rejection of a shift in the traditional interpretation of a given set of concrete data, that is, they involve an intolerance of cognitive ambiguity. Both accusations ignore the basic truth that all creative thought and all reasoning, being manifestations not of the stimulus, *per se*, but of the responding organism, essentially involve the utilization of psychological ambiguity.

The problem arises as to how long a society can exist in which there is a certain mastery of technology but in which the social, political and human outlook is impoverished to the point of dogmatic or distortive schemes.

Jaensch, who was the Hitler-appointed permanent president of the German Psychological Association, has explicitly espoused rigidity, perseveration and avoidance of differences of opinion as an ideal of discipline. Systematic adoption of rigid environmental controls by totalitarian regimes thus not only serves to inhibit or distort imagination and to prevent the acquisition of the theoretical skills so neces-

sary for the comprehension of reality, but even leads to a glorification of this defect and to its being turned into a propagandistic weapon. The thorough rigidification of a nation which may in the end be achieved by such means must lead to a lack of adaptability and thus finally to self-destruction. Toynbee warned of this danger when he said that nations are rarely murdered and suggested that it may be more appropriate to say that they commit suicide.

Are the dreaded trends just described inevitable? Are increased narrow-mindedness, over-simplification, and exclusion the only possible reactions to existing threats, insecurities and tensions? We do not believe so. On the contrary, there is good psychological evidence that the same forces which bring about regression to immature intellectual devices may also have a very different, indeed an opposite, effect, namely that of promoting maturity and wisdom. As far as individuals are concerned, the emergence of one or the other of the alternative patterns depends on the initial strength and maturity of the personality involved. We may hypothesize that given a certain original distribution of relative dominance of one pattern over the other, this dominance may be made more pronounced in either direction by conflict and tension. It goes without saying that in order to bring out fully the destructive or the constructive alternative, society must lend its support to the trend in question, or at least some aspect of the social institutions or some authoritative figures must further the respective pattern of personality organization.

Considering now the more constructive alternative just suggested, the history of individuals and of nations shows that objective threats, difficulties and uncertain-

ties frequently have mobilized and strengthened rather than stifled and paralyzed existing internal resources, creativity, and moral stamina. The existence of uncertainty and conflict may, furthermore, heighten instead of reduce the intensity and scope of conscious concentration and of awareness in general, leading to a widening of understanding, broader identification, and intensified sympathy and compassion. Under this pattern, the more confusing and misleading the various manifestations of a complex situation become, the greater will become the stimulus and the power to penetrate to the essence of the matters involved, and the greater will be the striving for a kind of clarity which does not involve sacrificing the existing ambiguities. Reasoned deliberation and a many-sided orientation will thus be sharpened rather than blunted in the face of complexities which call for subtle differentiations if they are to be successfully resolved.

Over-all dichotomies and dramatizations in which individuals are conceived of as either conforming and altogether good or as deviant and altogether bad must therefore be replaced by the differentiation between the kind of individual who enriches his culture by some degree of independence and the kind of individual who in effect shows a global defiance of the democratic institutions and thus is the truly subversive personality. It is the differentiation between constructive and compulsive conformity that allows us to draw the line between realistic protection against actual treason and unrealistic, diffuse expectations of betrayal and generalized suspiciousness.

The rationality that characterizes this kind of independence does by no means imply amorality and freedom from obligation. On the

contrary, genuine ethical behavior involves a comprehension of the issues involved, a facing of conflicts and of one's own guilt and a readiness to accept the anguish involved in such an open confrontation.

Furthermore, the avoidance of the absolute quest for certainty does not imply boundless relativism, cynicism and morbid doubt. On the contrary, we find the so-called need for absolutes often combined with basic disbelief and general distrust.

In surveying present-day writings on the subject we find many authors resigned to the fact that irrational, absolute and dogmatic argumentation will readily incite to action while the rational, many-sided approach frequently seems to prove inherently inhibitory and as leading to a barren and sterile conception of life. Against this we must hold that the virility of a nation cannot in the end be grounded in blind fanaticism, militant aggressiveness, and short-cuts to action. Our findings on the authoritarian personality pattern show that individuals who are more open to reason and facts are in general at the same time those who have a more differentiated internal life and deeper and more reliable, if often relatively calm, emotions. They are also those who, although less fanatic and less compulsive, show more consistency, conviction and dedication in their principles and ideals.

But the fact remains that extreme or highly obvious positions lend themselves more readily to compact verbal formulation and thus give the false impression of solving some of the perennial perplexities of our society. Such definite and unqualified statements are especially suited for being put into the service of either very concrete or very general assertions. In the task of a positive formulation

of the democratic outlook and values, on the other hand, the difficulties intrinsic in the complexities, ambiguities, flexibilities and less fetching logicalities of social reality must be faced in an explicit manner.

We must assume variations between different cultures with respect to their readiness to tolerate ambiguity. This readiness relates not only to the structure of social and political institutions but is also connected with, and expressed in, the philosophical and psychological outlook. For the United States, a long-range optimism seems justified to this writer. On the one hand it must be granted that there are probable reinforcers of the intolerant personality pattern in our culture. Among them we may list the following as the most important: presence of external threats; cultural emphasis on success and power; the necessity of proving oneself, if by no other means than by establishing social distance to those who are allegedly lower on the social scale; increasing standardization; increasing unintelligibility of political and social forces; presence of a well-developed publicity machinery capable of being used to influence public opinion; increasing difficulties in a genuine identification with society, resulting from the anonymity of big organizations and the ensuing isolation of the individual; some tendency toward a short-cut to action, toward externalization, and toward avoidance of introspection and contemplation.

Fortunately it seems that, in this country at least, these potential

reinforcers of tendencies toward rigidity are more than counterbalanced by a long series of powerful reinforcers of tolerance for ambiguity and for liberalism in general. The most outstanding of these are the democratic political tradition with its distribution of power which makes a check-and-balance system possible; the tradition of a pragmatic philosophy which, in contrast to the German philosophical tradition, is undogmatic and anti-metaphysical; the widespread preference for scientific and rational explanations; the relative weakness of the tendencies toward over-systematization and fanaticism; the "melting pot" ideal; the protective attitude toward the weak; the emphasis on individualism; the equalitarian relationships between children and parents, and between pupils and teachers; the readiness to criticize governmental as well as parental authorities; the increased choices offered by technological progress; the rising attempts to understand the social and economic processes in their inconsistencies and irrationalities; and the ability and readiness to sustain conflict, suspense and tentativeness.

The two patterns are in opposition to each other not only within our civilization as a whole, but within every single individual. How their struggle will end depends to a large extent on the interplay of political, social and psychological forces in their entirety; but it also depends on the number and initiative of mature and rational individuals in our society.

## THE PROBLEM OF LOYALTY IN GROUPS UNDER TENSION\*

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In thinking about what a sociologist might contribute to this panel, it occurred to me to examine a set of twenty-five textbooks in introductory sociology, published between 1945-1954, to determine what they had to say about the causes and effects of war. I was dismayed to find that, in the 17,000 pages which these volumes contained, there were only some 275 pages which dealt with war in any of its manifestations. More than half of the texts dealt with this single most important problem of the modern world in less than ten pages. It might well seem that, under these circumstances, sociology texts bid fair to become a new species of "escape literature."

There are many reasons why text book writers have neglected this critical problem. One of the most important is that text writers can, after all, only mirror what others have already accomplished. Their task is to synthesize, organize, and communicate the theories and researches that already exist. If sociology texts have little or nothing to say about war, this is partly so because sociologists have given them little or nothing to report on.

In considering how this monumental lacuna might be remedied, the question arises as to where the larger theoretical frameworks, which can guide sociological research into wars and international tensions, will come from. There seem to be two quarters from

which such aid could be derived. On the one hand, we need to explore the possibility of using theories which were developed to explain inter-group conflict on a smaller scale, such as ethnic or industrial conflict. Generalization from theories dealing with ethnic or industrial conflict might well provide guidelines for the construction of a model of international tensions. A second possible aid in constructing a theory of international tensions may also be found in the functional theory developed by social scientists such as Florian Znaniecki, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Merton.

The following remarks will draw upon both strategies. What I want to do is to examine a very limited theoretical problem, albeit one of some practical importance, the problem of loyalty in social systems under tension. I shall essay an analysis of the problem of loyalty in its relations to the other needs of social systems, especially their needs for skill and efficiency. This problem can be fruitfully examined in the context of industrial conflict. By proposing certain parallels between industrial tension and international tension, an examination of the former and more microscopic context might enable us to formulate hypotheses, and they are no more than that, concerning the problem of loyalty in a larger world undergoing international tensions.

It is commonplace to think of modern industry as typically and dominantly organized so as to maximize efficiency, particularly by the impartial selection of expert and skilled personnel. Effi-

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ciency is considered to be the dominant industrial value, while other values conflicting with it are held to be subordinate or somehow alien to modern industrial organization. In the innovating Western Electric studies, for example, Roethlisberger and Dickson distinguished between the logics of cost and efficiency, on the one hand, and the logic of sentiment, on the other. They maintain that the former logics characterize managerial elites while the logic of sentiment, "deeply rooted in sentiment and feeling," is viewed as distinctive of employee or worker echelons (7) Warner and Low's study of industrial conflict in Yankee City makes a similar point. They regard the managerial group as dominated by the aim of producing "at the lowest possible cost and highest profit," and consider that advancement is given primarily to those who contribute more to "the efficiency of production." (8)

Now, when a modern management elite is contrasted with ordinary workers they are, indeed, characterized by their greater concern for efficiency. Similarly, when modern industrial organizations are contrasted with earlier work arrangements, the former necessarily appear as paragons of rationality and technical efficiency. Such historical or status contrasts, however, tend to focus analysis too narrowly on the elements which distinguish modern management or industry. The fact is that a group's distinguishing characteristics are not its only characteristics. Systematic attention must also be given to those features which modern industry shares in common with other social systems; for these shared characteristics may be as important as the distinctive ones in shaping organizational behavior.

Enterprises, it would seem, are

efficient so that they may survive; strange to say, they do not survive in order that they may be efficient. Efficiency, however, is no more necessary for organizational survival than a goodly number of other conditions, one of the most important of which is "loyalty" to the organization. It is only when loyalty is taken for granted that organizational attention can be fully focused on efficiency; where loyalty is problematic it may become as salient as, or even more prominent than the satisfaction of efficiency needs. This seems to be implicit in the comments which Mr. E. C. Hughes made some time ago concerning industrial organization in colonial areas.

"In the colonial or semi-colonial regions, management often quite frankly talks of the necessity of keeping management in loyal hand . . . In the mother countries of industry, one does not hear such talk, but it is possible that the mechanism operates without people being aware of it. Industry is not a labor broker, for it uses the labor to build a continuing organization for work; it must live with its laboring people . . . Industry thus considers its people not merely as technical help (as they would if guided solely by the logics of cost and efficiency — a.w.g.), but as actual or potential participants in a struggle for power within industry and society, and as potential close colleagues (or unfit to be such)." (6)

Just as no organization can successfully maintain itself if it completely disregards an economic allocation of its resources, so, too, does every organization — industrial as well as others — require that its members have some degree of loyalty to it as a unique social structure. Even if it never conducts a single "loyalty investigation," no organization can ever be totally indifferent to the loyalty of its members, if it wishes to survive. If economic enterprises examine loyalty less intensively than do political groups, it is not



because loyalty is unimportant to them but because they nominally give exclusive allegiance to the doctrine of efficiency thus placing a concern about loyalty under the ban of pathos. One may for example interpret the persisting tendency of many modern enterprises to be organized on family lines, despite the dominance of corporate forms, as latently functional for the satisfaction of loyalty needs. If the behavior of economic organizations requires us to postulate loyalty needs, this can hardly be less true for national political groups. It is doubtful whether there has ever been a nation which has blissfully disregarded the national loyalties of its citizens. In this perspective, then, a concern about national loyalty is an inevitability which derives in part from the requirements for stability in any kind of a social system. The critical question, therefore, is not whether nations have a "right" to concern themselves with the national loyalty of their citizens. The important queries will bear instead on the degree of loyalty-consciousness, for this can be great or little, the methods employed in appraising loyalty, the cost entailed and the possible functional equivalents in seeking to secure loyalty.

The costs entailed by an intense loyalty consciousness are indicated in a study of European business management which was recently made by Harbison and Burgess. They found the business leaders of France, Belgium and Italy to be a class-conscious group whose stress on loyalty to the firm has generated a lack of horizontal mobility which is conducive to ideological and technological rigidity. Harbison and Burgess maintain that the undermanning of industrial management in these countries is partly due to the feeling that there is a "shortage of people who can be trusted to fill managerial posi-

tions." (5) A similar lack of confidence in the loyalty of lower level subordinates was also noted as impairing the development of organizational teams, as inhibiting the delegation of responsibility, and discouraging enterprise growth and expansion of the market.

Here, then, is further documentation that industrial organizations do not live by efficiency alone. They require the loyalty of their members as well as their efficiency and skills. The interesting point for organizational theory, however, is not the multiplicity of organizational needs, but the indication that there is some tension among them. Specifically, Harbison and Burgess' study clearly indicates that the pursuit of organizational needs for loyalty may impair and circumscribe needs for organizational efficiency. It is to be expected that any group, nations no less than industrial ones, must pay some price when they become loyalty-conscious. This price, of course, need not be measurable in dollars and cents. There is for this reason an important difference in the visibility of the costs entailed by a concern for loyalty on the enterprise level and on the national level. It is comparatively easy to detect the price which European management has paid for its loyalty consciousness. It is much harder objectively to appraise and convincingly demonstrate the costs which a nation pays for a similar loyalty-sensitivity. As a result, one may mistakenly assume that no costs at all are entailed.

Concern with the satisfaction of loyalty needs is not peculiar to "backward" European or colonial managements which are besieged by class and ethnic opponents. It may also be found in the more technologically advanced and relatively secure American enterprise. It is well known, of course,

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that there are discriminative disadvantages directed against Negroes, Jews, and Catholics, which prevent them from entering the top managerial echelons in many segments of American industry. These patterns need to be interpreted in their relation to organizational needs for loyalty no less than similar practices in colonial enterprise. Two excellent empirical studies have documented anew the persistence of particularistic discrimination even in the technologically advanced segments of American industry. One of these, by Mr. Orvis Collins, comments as follows:

"It is one of the shibboleths of modern management that advancement from job to job must be based on efficiency . . . Once, however, several candidates are admitted to possess the technical efficiency required for performance of the work, other qualifications become important. And at Somerset, a New England factory, the most important of these is the ethnic identification of the individuals involved." (2)

Collins found that in this plant the president, the five vice-presidents, seven of the eight superintendents, and seven of eight personnel officers, were all "Yankees," that is, of English descent or culture. In contrast, workers of Irish origin could ascend no higher than the lowest supervisory rung, that is, to the level of foreman.

In another in-plant study, Melville Dalton concludes that the selection of management is "to a large extent . . . carried on informally, with personnel rising from lower strata by conforming to social characteristics of personnel in upper strata. The chief criteria are ethnicity, religion, participation in specific out-plant activities, political affiliation, and membership in accepted secret societies. Evidence showed no necessary relation be-

tween these criteria and capacity to forward plant goals." (3)

These and other studies suggest that the social characteristics of leadership in formal organizations may differ somewhat from those of other group members. This is consequential for the problem of loyalty, broadly conceived, in several important ways. First, to the degree that a leadership's social characteristics diverge from those of its membership or subordinates, then it is likely that to this extent it will be harder for it to extract consent from those in the lower rungs. Paradoxically, then, if an ethnically sensitive and particularistic selection of leadership is intended to cope with defections of loyalty, it also induces a withdrawal of loyalty thus generating a vicious cycle.

Secondly, should the leadership identify the organization with itself, saying, as Robert Michels noted that they so often did, "I am the state," there is the danger that they will equate loyalty to themselves with loyalty to the organization as a whole. They may, therefore, develop a distrust of others who do not share their social characteristics. Those who are not white, Protestant, of English descent, who do not belong to the Masons or who do not live in the right suburbs, may come to be viewed as less loyal, not for what they have done or even for what they believe, but simply for what they are. That this is more than an anxiety-ridden speculation may be seen in the treatment of the Japanese-Americans following Pearl Harbor.

The above cited studies provide some evidence consistent with the assumption that the recruitment of industrial management, even in technologically advanced segments, is oriented to the satisfaction of loyalty needs. There is little doubt, also, that many sections of man-

agement were and are consciously concerned about the loyalty of their workers, particularly when it is feared that this will be traduced by trade union membership. The classic union-management tensions are, in some measure, heightened by a genuine managerial fear of the "dual loyalties" generated by union affiliation.

If this is true on the industrial level, is it also true on the national level as well? It is evident that international tensions intensify concern about the loyalty of the national group. But may it not also be true, and worthy of serious study, that anxieties concerning the loyalty of citizens dispose national groups to assume belligerent postures which in turn reinforce international tension? In short, it may be valuable to test the hypothesis that there is a two-way bridge between inter-group conflict and intra-group doubts about loyalty, each reinforcing the other.

While the above mentioned indications of interest in the loyalty of the labor force are important, they are but dramatic indications of a more endemic and deeply rooted managerial concern with the loyalty of its personnel, a concern which may clash with management's interest in efficiency. A critical expression of the tension between skill and loyalty needs in industry occurs when loyalty is regarded as evidenced by the length of the employee's seniority. Whether or not length of seniority is a good index of loyalty is beside the point. The important consideration here is that many managers do use seniority as an informal index of worker loyalty. In certain of its forms, then, the overt and fully recognized conflict between advancement on the basis of skill or on the basis of seniority is, in effect, an expression of an underlying tension between skill

and loyalty needs. The managerial dilemma arises, of course, when those possessing skill and competence may be new to the organization or otherwise lacking in demonstrated loyalty, or when those having seniority-proved loyalty are less technically qualified. (4)

Again, one may conjecture about the implications of this on the national level. Would adequate studies reveal that length of residence in the national group, like that in the industrial group, comes to be viewed as an implicit and informal index of loyalty? Let us hope not. For, if so, this can induce peculiarly important tensions in a country like the United States which, like few others, is a nation of immigrants and the sons of immigrants. The growth and increased use of such an index of loyalty on the national scale might well intensify cleavages between immigrants and native born, between first, second, or third generation Americans, and those whose ancestors came earlier. Here, perhaps, is another side from which to appraise the costs entailed by increased loyalty-sensitivity.

Several of the studies cited suggest that the pursuit of loyalty needs takes place, in important part, by the selective recruitment of leadership elites in terms of particularistic criteria. Various researches—for example, Warner and Low's—indicate that ethnic groups will not necessarily be excluded from lower level jobs, precisely because of their ethnicity. That is, their minority status makes them insecure and vulnerable personnel and, therefore, more readily controllable. Indeed, there is always the possibility of what may be called "political Sikhism," after the warlike Indian Sikhs, in which one ethnic minority group has so thoroughly validated its loyalty that it is used as a power tool against other ethnic groups,

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just as the Sikhs once saved India for the British. Commonly, however, minority ethnic groups are excluded from industrial power centers, as Hughes suggested. If this should occur on the national level, and in governmental as well as in industrial organizations, then it might presage the costly emergence of a system of political and social stratification of an increasingly "caste"-like character, which is deeply incompatible with our traditional open class system.

It is clear that we cannot regard the particularistic selection of leadership elites, or of personnel in general, as peculiar to industrial organization. It may well be, as Mr. Chester Barnard has suggested, that loyalty-sensitive rather than efficiency-centered personnel selection is even more characteristic of religious, academic and political bodies. (1) The probability is that these tensions are common to formal and rationally organized bureaucratic groups in all spheres.

A word about Max Weber's generalized theory of bureaucracy may therefore be germane. In general, Weber seems to have tacitly assumed and therefore neglected the role of loyalty needs as functional prerequisites of bureaucratic groups. His analysis of bureaucracy seems more relevant for those groups and those situations—more common perhaps in the nineteenth than the twentieth century—in which loyalty needs were fully and readily satisfied. It cannot be supposed, however, that a bureaucracy operating in an environment extremely dangerous to itself, which is surrounded either by devils or earthly foes and competitors, or which perceives itself so encircled, will give the recruitment of expert personnel a more salient place than the reinforcement of loyalty. In short, it seems likely that organizations will place less stress on the symbols of

loyalty when their mood is one of self-confidence and when they are on the rise *vis-a-vis* their competitors. They seem more likely to focus on needs for loyalty, and to subordinate other group needs to this, giving less reward to efficiency and skill, when they feel themselves challenged and when they face rising antagonists.

There is a deadly paradox in all this which can hardly be missed. It is this: as international tensions flare into local wars, and as small wars promise larger ones, the concern with loyalty mounts to a crescendo that threatens to impair needs for skill and efficiency at the very moment when they are most needed for national defense. No one will maintain that, when Germany lost Einstein, they made a reasonable bargain, losing his skill and genius for an equivalent gain in loyalty and security.

There is also something of a cycle involved, not a vicious but a tragic cycle, a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy that generates the very dire events its predicts. As loyalty - consciousness intensifies, bringing with it the berating of the "egghead," the baiting of the intellectual, the suspicion of the brain-trust and a distrust of experts, we may well loosen the very bonds of loyalty we seek to reinforce. Bludgeons do not make men believe; they only make them cautious conformers.

It seems reasonable to conclude then, that if modern forms of administration are not to regress towards earlier patterns of particularism and nepotism, where loyalty is a dominating concern, and if there is to be a continuing development of efficient forms of administration, then there must be a reduction in those conflicts which generate crises of loyalty. If the reduction of international tensions is a necessary condition for reducing crises of loyalty, then

it is likely that a reduction in the crises of loyalty can also bring a lowering of anxieties and tensions which work themselves out on the plane of international hostilities.

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## NEEDED RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ON PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE

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I have been asked to discuss the general question of needed research in social psychology relevant to problems of war and peace. This is for me a familiar area of great personal interest. From 1937 to 1941 I was chairman of a committee set up by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (a kind of analogue of the Society for the Study of Social Problems) on the psychology of war and peace. This committee labored manfully between 1937 and 1941 to produce an integrated psychological analysis of the factors leading to the occurrence of international warfare. Unfortunately, events caught up with us and most of the work of the

committee has never reached formal publication.

Since 1941, and particularly since 1946, there have been substantial changes in the research interest and theoretical developments among social psychologists which well justify a new look at the field. Rather than rehash any of the old materials which our committee collected and about which I have talked at other gatherings, I should like this afternoon to pick up what I consider to be three important trends in the development of modern social psychology, and relate these to the problems of research on war and peace.

These three trends are as follows: 1. studies of social perception; 2. studies of group norms and group goals; and 3. studies of leadership. It seems to me that if

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social psychology has any substantial contribution to make in this area, it will probably derive from one, or more likely, from a synthesis of all three of these areas.

Let me first say a few words with regard to the problem of social perception. It is by now a commonplace that the facts, as seen on one side of a national frontier, are not necessarily the facts as seen on the other side of that dividing line. We have learned through painful experience that what the Russians mean by democratic, free elections, is not the same thing as is meant by this phrase in the United States. Similarly, we have learned that the French perception of German troops organized into a European Army is by no means the same as the German perception of this same phenomenon. We could go on multiplying such examples indefinitely. These purely popular observations do not provide us with the kind of material we need either for scientific research or for social policy. In recent years there has been an attempt to pin down the significant variables involved in such divergences in perception, and we are beginning at least to find out what are the important problems which would be relevant from the point of view of war and international policy.

Before talking about these implications for future research, let me just mention what I consider to be some of the interesting developments in this area. One of my students, Mr. Joseph Kamenetzky, has shown that the same man is perceived as having different characteristics if he is labeled as a corporation executive or as a union officer. Pro-union observers ascribed to him favorable traits in the latter role; unfavorable in the former. Anti-union observers reversed this trend. Another interesting study by Dr. Albert Pepi-

tone has shown that people who desire a goal strongly tend to distort the observed behavior of persons blocking their way to this goal more than do persons whose desire for the goal is weak. Other studies have indicated that we ascribe our own values and motives to people we like, but undesirable values and motives to those we dislike and so on.

Does this matter? I believe it does. Far too much of our determination of foreign policy has been based on the assumption that we know what the real facts are. But no one has systematically attempted to correct for such sources of perceptual bias as those I have indicated in the preceding paragraph. Let me now say a few things about what I consider to be needed research in this area. We need very much to have additional research on the kind and amount of perceptual distortion to be expected of persons filling certain social roles. If possible, this also should be tied to some basic personality characteristics. Thus, if Mr. A reports a given state of affairs, we might be able to estimate what kinds of distortion are likely to occur within his report and to what extent his observations would be validated by a number of independent observers.

Another kind of needed research is on how people of stated personality and social role characteristics can be influenced to change their perceptions. Is it true that some people are influenced only by a show of strength? Or is it true that a show of strength only evokes counter-aggression? We need to know the circumstances under which either or both of these statements may be relevant. It appears, for example, that our disarmament in 1946 did not convince the Soviets that we were inclined to peace, nor did our rearmament in 1949. However, to

say that such communication is impossible, is a counsel of despair. Perhaps we may yet ascertain methods by which such international messages may be sent and received undistorted, or at least received bearing the same content as we intended.

From the purely practical point of view, such studies as those I have indicated, would be helpful because behavior is determined by perception. It we want to predict Soviet action we must understand how *they* see the situation, not assume that they will act on the basis of how *we* see it. And if we want to undercut their acts or develop effective opposition, we must know how other people see things: for example, in IndoChina, in Italy, and in Guatemala.

However, it is conceivable that our major goal should not be to oppose everything the USSR does. Perhaps this amounts only to letting them determine our foreign policy. Perhaps our dominant goal should be the achievement of stable world relationships. In this case, we may want to use as guides the percepts of persons who accept this goal as a major and feasible achievement. Diplomats who are dominated by goals such as competition and destruction of an opposing system, cannot perceive opportunities to make progress toward the lessening of conflict.

This conception leads us to a consideration of the importance of goals and goal determination. Toward what goals are the groups involved in effective determination of international policy striving? What goals are really decisive for the rulers of Russia, for the pro-communists of Guatemala, for the mid-West isolationists? To take the last as a concrete and convenient example, is mid-West isolationism truly a form of xenophobia as is so often conveniently

asserted? Or, is it rather a by-product of concern with farm prices, of an attempt to insulate major economic goals from disturbing and threatening conditions? Is it possible that we can, by discovering the major goals which are decisive in modifying perception, bypass some barriers to world cooperation which at present look quite impassable?

Several significant variables seem to have been established as determinants of what the individual will selectively perceive in any given complex, social situation. These are first of all his pre-existing attitudes including his prejudices for and against national groups and institutional forms. Secondly, his goal orientations, those values towards which he is striving as well as those which he seeks to avoid. Third, his prevailing level of anxiety which seems to have an effect particularly in terms of the extremeness of characteristics attributed to a particular stimulus object. This would agree with the tendency of attitudes to polarize in times of crisis. Fourth, propaganda or suggestion, the influence of cues extraneous to the situation in determining how the individual shall perceive the situation. And fifth, the influence of a leader, who may structure the situation in such a fashion that one perception rather than another obtains dominance for the followers.

Let us turn now to a consideration of small group research. I realize that this is an area which is in dispute between the social psychologists and the sociologists. However, most psychological research in this area probably can be defended in terms of the fact that we are attempting to establish more detailed knowledge of the variations in the group process which produce defined effects within an individual participant.

The work of Sherif on the autokinetic phenomenon, in which he demonstrated the tendency of individual norms to be modified in the development of a group norm, is a case in point. More recently, Asch has shown that by using an instructed majority, we can put enough pressure on an individual that he will report seeing things contradictory to clearly defined external stimuli.

We are now interested in applying these observations to norms of greater social significance. So, for example, Dr. Edwin Lawson has just finished a study for me in which we took extreme nationalists and extreme internationalists from a college population and subjected them to a high degree of group pressure in the opposite direction; that is, a nationalist would be put into a group situation with an overwhelming majority of internationally minded persons who were instructed to argue strongly against his position, and the same in reverse for the internationalists.

Under these conditions, (and remember these subjects were people whose attitudes were fairly extreme and, therefore, probably somewhat more firmly fixed than would be characteristic of the average college student), about 36 of the 40 experimental subjects showed decided shifts in the direction of the group pressure. A few individuals shifted away from the group pressure, but these were apparently cases of students who rejected the reference group and instead considered it to be an instance of stupidity (in the case of the internationalists under nationalist pressure), or of communistic tendencies (in the case of one nationalist who was under internationalist pressure). Even more striking is the fact that almost none of these students who did change their attitudes as a result

of pressure realized the fact; most of them denied that they had made any changes as a result of the group situation.

Such observations as this may have some bearing on the fact that individuals coming into a bureaucracy or institutional structure from the outside rapidly modify their perceptions and attitudes to conform to the prevailing climate within the organization. Once a group norm has been established, it can become a highly coercive cue determining the perception of the situation for newcomers as long as they desire to be accepted into the group. If, as was suggested in the preceding passage, the individual rejects the reference group, then of course, the group norm may have no effect, or it might even have a negative effect, inducing an emphasis on characteristics opposite to those stressed by the group.

It seems safe to assume that, even in a democracy, effective decision-making is concentrated in a fairly small group. We have no institutional forms which permit truly effective participation of large groups in policy formation. Furthermore, these groups seem to have a high degree of continuity without respect to political party control. Certainly Republican policy in foreign affairs represents no sharp break with Democratic policy. We are assured of this from time to time by the plaintive protests of the *Chicago Tribune*.

We need to know more, sociologically and psychologically, about the people who formulate policies and make decisions. We need to know the goals they perceive as vital, the group norms they accept, the socio-economic factors which have conditioned their thinking. I am inclined to say, with Sigmund Freud, that reason cannot deal with a problem until all the relevant facts are

consciously recognized.

Perhaps the most important problem in this area, and the one on which we have the least satisfactory information, is the problem of leadership. We are in general agreement that leaders have as one of their major functions that of structuring the situation for their followers. Consequently, it is of the greatest importance that we understand how the leaders of particular national groups perceive certain kinds of conflict situations, and crucial issues. Behind this, in terms of a basic psychological analysis, is the question: what are the major motives and goals of the leader; to what kinds of group pressures has he been subjected in the past; and of what kinds of groups is he now a member?

I can illustrate this point by referring to some of my own work in the field of union-management relations. It was hypothesized that an individual who is selectively attracted to the role of corporation executive would be an individual with a strong desire for power, whereas a person who is attracted to a leadership role in a labor union would be one with a strong desire for group acceptance and security. I will not go into the reasons for this hypothesis at the present time except to say that they were derived from an analysis of the institutional structures involved. In a study of Illinois labor relations directors and labor union officials we found that these two hypotheses were verified: that is, corporation executives showed more concern with individual power and union officials showed more concern with group acceptance and security. Now if this is true, we can predict that on future issues members of each group will characteristically show selective perception, that is, they will emphasize those aspects of the situa-

tion which will either further or threaten the particular goal orientations which are important to them. They will transmit this biased perception of the situation to their followers, with the probability that conflict may ensue.

It is entirely plausible to assume that the same kind of process occurs in the field of national leadership, except that we do not have nearly as much information as we should with regard to the psychodynamics of individuals who are attracted to and able to achieve leadership roles in national politics and power structures. If we had this information, we might conceivably be able to identify certain kinds of appeals and pressures which would be particularly likely to be effective with an individual of this psychodynamic structure. We might then be more effective in modifying national policy and inducing a program which was better calculated to achieve peaceful relationships between nations.

The possibility is also worth considering that, if we find national leaders consistently coming from a certain stratum of society, or from any group which can be limited in some fashion, then educational and propaganda efforts directed to this group may be more effective than working on the leader as an individual. It is obvious, for example, that unless we can modify the climate of opinion of the group within which power figures move, their perceptions will continue to be supported by the reference group which they accept.

What, then, are our research needs in the social psychology of war and peace? They are numerous, but I think the following are some of the most urgent. 1. What are the major goals which people are trying to achieve through international relations? 2. What perceptual distortions are induced by these goals? 3. What kind of per-

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sonality structure is attracted to and capable of achieving leadership in this area? 4. What are the decisive policy-making groups? What norms do they accept? What pressures do they exert on public officials? 5. What tactics are likely to be most effective in modifying the perceptions of such personalities?

It is clear that what I have been saying points towards an interdisciplinary research program rather than one dominated entirely by psychological conceptions. In the field of group goals and

power politics obviously the role of the political scientist should be stressed. With regard to institutional structures and group pressures, sociologists no doubt could contribute very substantially. Some aspects of goal strivings have been particularly investigated by the economists; and so on. I think that what we need is a cross-fertilization of these disciplines with regard to concepts and methodology so that we can achieve the most efficient program of research possible at this time on these very pressing problems.

## PATTERNS OF PUERTO RICAN DISPERSION IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES\*

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Drama, rather than either absolute or relative numbers, has called attention to migration from Puerto Rico in the past nine years. Several spectacular wrecks of the war-weary planes used to transport the migrants in the early post-war years, plus their involvement as "innocent bystanders" in political cross-fire in New York City, attracted the attention of newspaper and magazine writers. Their legal status as citizens and, therefore, migrants conflict in the public mind with their role as Spanish-speaking bearers of another culture, and they are often treated as immigrants. Shortages of housing, schools and other community facilities in most of the areas into which they moved further complicated the situation.

It is estimated that in December 1953 there were 443,000 Puerto Rican-born persons in the continental United States, plus 126,000 of Puerto Rican parentage. The annual average net in-migration, 1945-1953, was 39,190. (3)

The Puerto Rican migration is of interest to demographers, however, in spite of the comparatively small numbers involved. First, it provides further proof of the findings of such students of the field as Jerome (4) and Thomas (9) on the close relationship between employment opportunities and population shifts. Correlation between Puerto Rican migration to the continental United States from 1908 to 1952 shows a co-efficient of .82. The present "rolling adjustment" has caused a slackening of the migratory flow which began to be appreciable early last fall and turned into a more-than-seasonal

\*Paper read to the annual meeting of the Population Association of America held in Charlottesville, Virginia, May 9, 1954.



net reverse flow during the last quarter of the calendar year 1953. The first 8 months of 1954 showed a decrease of 49.8 per cent in the migration compared with the same period of 1953.

Second, the oft-debated question of the effects of sustained out-migration on the demography and economy of an area is being studied as the process develops. Davis has reported on recent changes in age and sex distribution. (2) Jaffe will soon have the results of his studies on changes in composition of the labor force as well as age and sex changes. The Social Science Research Center of the University of Puerto Rico is studying the incidence and effects of the high turnover rate in new industrial plants. What seems to be happening is that workers trained in the vocational schools and then given special instruction in vestibule classes become motivated toward migration as they acquire some mechanical and industrial experience. Plant managers report that bonus payments sometimes result in a substantial loss of their workers, who buy plane tickets with their windfall.

The 1948 study of the Bureau of Applied Social Research (5) and the special report of the Census Bureau on *Puerto Ricans in Continental United States* (1) showed that the migration was highly selective in several important aspects. For instance, skilled workers were found to constitute 18 per cent of the labor force in the migratory stream compared with 5 per cent in the island's labor force; semi-skilled workers, 41 per cent against 20 per cent; unskilled, 21 per cent against 50 per cent, in the Bureau study.

Recent years have seen a rapid rise in the ratio of net out-migration to natural increase. The out-flow represented 85 per cent of natural increase in 1951, 98 per

cent in 1952 and 110 per cent in 1953. (7) This has been helpful to "Operation Bootstrap."

Levels of living have been raised significantly in recent years. (6) Life expectancy, for instance, rose from 46 in 1940 to 61 in 1952, or 33 per cent. The crude death rate dropped from 18.4 in 1940 to 9.0 in 1953, a decrease of 51 per cent. The birth rate, however, fell only 3.5 points, to 35.2. Population growth ate up 34 per cent of the economy's advance between 1940 and 1952; i.e., national income went up 108 per cent (in constant prices), but per capita income rose only 74 per cent. And this in spite of a net out-migration of around 300,000 persons during that twelve years.

It would seem reasonable to predict that Puerto Rican migration will at least resume its former levels if recession turns into prosperity rather than into depression.

It can also be expected that previous tendencies toward dispersion would be revived if and when "full employment" again prevails. Some aspects of the dispersion will therefore be examined.

First, it should be noted that Puerto Ricans were found in all but nine states in the 1910 census (North and South Dakota, Kentucky, Alabama, Mississippi, Idaho, New Mexico, Arizona and Utah). By 1920, Utah, Nevada, and Wyoming, were the only states without Puerto Ricans. The 1930 and succeeding censuses report Puerto Rican-born persons in all 48 states.

The 1940 census found ten states with 200 or more; the number of such states had risen to 26 by 1950.

The Puerto Rican-born population of New York City rose 306 per cent between 1940 and 1950, but there was an appreciably higher rise outside New York City—442 per cent. The proportion living in New York City dropped 4.9 per

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cent from 1940 to 1950—from 87.8 per cent to 82.9 per cent.

Our estimate is that the rise in New York City Puerto Rican-born population from the census date to April, 1953, was 48.8 per cent, compared with 83.8 per cent for the outside.

However, recent spotty data indicate that the recession has led to a reversal of this trend. The field staff of the Migration Division of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor reports one once-thriving Puerto Rican community after another in which numbers have been reduced by 50 to 75 per cent since April, 1953. These are in the heavy industry areas which have been hit hardest by unemployment in foundries, steel mills, etc. Our initial assumption on becoming aware of this movement was that people would retreat to New York City. This does not seem to be indicated by the records of the employment section of the New York office of the Migration Division. The variables affecting return to Puerto Rico versus retreat to the metropolis are still subject to conjecture. They are undoubtedly related to some of the variables we do know something about. Light can be shed on them by examining the geographical patterns first.

The second largest state of Puerto Rican settlement from 1910 to 1950 was California. "Intervening opportunities" didn't seem to provide strong attractions until 1953, when Illinois took second place. But, it turns out, San Francisco, which had rated second to New York as a residence for Puerto Ricans, in the 1910 to 1950 census counts, was an intervening opportunity. The original settlers in San Francisco had been on their way to Hawaii. Sugar cane interests from that island recruited Puerto Rican cane workers in the 1890s and early years of this century.

The trip by boat to the continent, and by train across it seems to have exhausted the "propensity to travel" of many persons who refused to continue the journey by boat. To these were added those who went on to Hawaii and then returned to settle in San Francisco, Oakland and on farms in California. There is now a Puerto Rican community in Hawaii of some 10,000 persons, first and succeeding generations.

In view of this experience, it would seem to be useful to separate the Puerto Rican movement to the continent into *spontaneous* and *organized* migration. If we further classify the movement into *primary* and *derived* settlement we can get a better idea of what we know and what is still subject to further investigation.

When we find Puerto Ricans in substantial clusters far from New York City we almost invariably find that either private or governmental organization has been responsible. Recent group placements have all been of the latter type, since private fee-charging agencies were eliminated by Puerto Rican legal action in 1947 after a number of disastrous experiences.

The Migration Division of the Commonwealth Department of Labor works under an agreement with the Bureau of Employment Security to utilize the clearance procedures of the United States Employment Service in assuring that no groups of workers from the island will be placed in areas experiencing labor surpluses. The Division then aids local labor, management, educational and civic groups to speed up the adjustment process.

Sizeable local communities have been founded by this process in Lorain, Cleveland, Youngstown, Gary, Milwaukee and Savanna, Illinois. Provo, Utah has a well-to-do community (with an average

of \$6,000 annual family income) which originated as a War Manpower Commission project.

A seasonal farm labor program operates in states east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio to cultivate and harvest crops with workers who would otherwise be unemployed during the "dead season" in the Puerto Rican cane fields. A small proportion of these men decide after two or three seasonal trips to the continent, to settle down either as year-round farm workers or as unskilled or semi-skilled workers in towns or cities near their farm employment. Contrary to popular notion, few move to New York City. Settlements in Buffalo, Rochester, and nearby towns and cities, in Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and in Eastern Pennsylvania are traceable to these migrants.

There are many small communities, however, in which no such cause can be found. We have some evidence to indicate two more factors at work. One is friendships in the armed forces between Puerto Ricans and other Americans which have led to job offers upon discharge. Success in the new location results in relatives and friends being called up from the island when local employment expands.

The second factor is indicated by several studies. The writer found a desire for adventure and travel given as reasons for wanting to go to the continent in a study of War Manpower recruits in 1946. (8) The Columbia study found 10 per cent of both male and female "primary" migrants gave desire for adventure as their main motive for migrating. Employment interviewers of the Migration Division, report anywhere from five to ten per cent of their applicants referring to some such reason for moving, in addition to search for better jobs, better economic oppor-

tunities, better cultural environment, more educational opportunities, better climate, and similar motives.

One founder of a prosperous business in a middle-sized Eastern city is a former New York City resident who got fed up with big city life, and divided his savings into \$95 for a grub-stake and \$5 for a bus ticket. His next settlement was determined by the ticket agent!

Derived settlement is more easily accounted for. Once the individual is established he looks for opportunities to bring his family and his relatives and friends. The Columbia study found 81 per cent reporting letters and face-to-face contact as their source of information about job opportunities, etc.

A recent unpublished study of the Puerto Ricans in Lorain, Ohio, a settlement just under 6 years old, found 83 per cent of those in the sample had relatives in Lorain.

The growth of derived settlement then would be a function of the relationship between the newly arrived Puerto Rican and his entire environment, including job opportunities, available housing, community educational and recreational facilities, etc., plus the close blood and ritual family ties of the Puerto Ricans. The migrant's definition of the situation as well as the objective situation is naturally influenced by his aspirations, education, color, sex, age and similar variables.

Since economic reasons provide the predominant motive for primary migration (89 per cent of male and 69 per cent of female "primary" migrants giving that reason in the Columbia study) the newcomer usually looks upon poor housing and other inconveniences as part of the price of future advancement. Those who migrated in search of "better cultural milieu" (12 per cent of males and 10 per

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cent of females in the Columbia study) and those who "sought adventure" may be affected differently.

Published data from the 1910 to 1950 censuses give us a picture of the influence of sex and color upon regional distribution. Both factors serve as barriers to Puerto Rican movement. There was, for example, still no Puerto Rican woman reported in North Dakota in the 1940 census, although Puerto Rican men had been in the state during the three previous censuses. Non-white males were lacking in fifteen states in 1940; non-white females were not found in twenty-two states.

Migration from Puerto Rico is color-selective. The 1940 census reported the population of Puerto Rico as 23.5 per cent non-white; the Puerto Rican-born residents of the continent as 13.2 per cent non-white. The gap was even greater in 1950: Puerto Rico, 20.3 per cent non-white; Puerto Ricans on the continent, 7.7 non-white. Even allowing for a sizeable margin of

enumerator error, the differences would seem important.

The mechanism of selection for color is indicated by the differences between the self-recorded skin color of the War Manpower Commission recruits who remained on the mainland (47 per cent) and those who had returned (53 per cent) in the minimum of 20 months expiring between their recruitment and the administration of a mail questionnaire by the writer in 1946. A five-tone scale common in Puerto Rico was used: white, light brown, brown, dark brown, black.

Those who remained differed from those who returned as follows:

Whites	11 per cent more
Light brown	5.7 per cent more
Brown	2.8 per cent fewer
Dark brown	3.0 per cent fewer
Black	10.9 per cent fewer

The attraction of the various regions of the continent is qualified by color, as the following table based on 1950 data shows:

TABLE 1. INCREASE OF PUERTO RICAN-BORN, BY COLOR: 1940-1950

Area	Both Groups	White	Non-White
United States	223.2	243.3	89.9
New York City	204.9	224.6	75.9
Northeast	208.4	227.5	84.1
Northeast (Outside New York State)	424.5	419.3	461.4
North Central	829.2	918.4	324.5
South	443.3	495.5	129.4
West	226.6	232.0	144.5

The only area in the country showing a larger proportional increase of non-whites than whites is the northeast outside of New York state. Relatively less race prejudice plus nearness to the major port of entry may well account for this. The widest discrepancy in the opposite direction is the South, as might be expected.

The Puerto Rican with a dark complexion has a particularly difficult status in the South, as is illustrated by the growing practice among Florida farm contractors of providing three sets of drinking fountains, toilets and segregated areas in theatres, bars, etc., in their camps! He is not equipped by the relative absence of discrimination

in Puerto Rico to play his role properly by Southern standards.

Color enters into where a man may live, even in New York City, which advertises that its "eight million citizens live in peace and harmony and enjoy the benefits of democracy." The Columbia study found 43 per cent of the Puerto Ricans in the core area in Manhattan (Harlem) to be non-white, compared with only 23 per cent in the Bronx.

The sex ratio by regions and for New York City in 1950 shows the selectivity of the sex factor:

U. S. as a whole	92.3
New York City	83.2
Northeast	86.4
Northeast (Outside NY State)	155.5
North Central	212.0
South	127.9
West	147.1

The difference between the

North Central and Western regions would seem to be contrary to the pattern of the 1935-1940 long-distance migration found by the Census Bureau which reported that "the farther migrants moved the higher the sex ratio," since New York and Miami are the only important ports of entry. The tight family pattern may be responsible for this difference. "I miss my family" was the most important single "unfavorable factor" in life on the continent for the 811 War Manpower recruits studied by the writer in 1946.

Color raises the sex ratio significantly for all areas except New York City, although it should be pointed that only 17,475 non-white Puerto Ricans were found on the continent by the 1950 census, i.e., 7.7 per cent of the 226,110 persons of Puerto Rican birth.

The sex ratios for the non-whites are as follows:

U. S. as a whole	98.8	(6.5 points higher than for whites)					
Northeast	91.9	2.4	"	"	"	"	"
Northeast (Outside NY State)	220.8	65.3	"	"	"	"	"
North Central	268.8	56.8	points	"	"	"	"
South	216.2	88.3	"	"	"	"	"
West	168.0	20.9	"	"	"	"	"

The sex balance in the migration as a whole has shifted since 1950, for reasons not yet clear. Fifty-eight per cent of the migrants in the fiscal year 1953 were males, according to a recent study by Jaffe. This may be connected with the increase of migration to points outside New York City.

The Puerto Rican migration, at least up to 1948, was predominantly urban in origin, both in place of last residence and place of birth. No later data are available but this factor undoubtedly affects the number of farm workers enumerated in the 1950 census, i.e., 1,995 persons out of 216,830

over fourteen years of age, or .009 per cent. All but 250 were white. Farm workers numbered 397 in 1940, so that the percentage increase in this occupation was almost twice that for the group as a whole. Given the fact that the organized seasonal farm labor program did not begin until 1947, the increase may point the way to a rural-to-rural migration tendency which will grow as the farm labor program grows. Only 3,000 workers were brought under the program in the first year, compared with 15,000 last season. Another 6,000 to 7,000 "free-wheelers" may now safely be added. They are

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P-E # 3



usually workers who have during previous seasonal trips established satisfactory personal and working relationships with farm employers and who now come independently.

These data may be helpful to social scientists and social workers in localities with Puerto Rican communities. More local studies such as are now under way in Philadelphia and Cleveland will help fill in the gaps in what we know about the characteristics, origin and motivations of a group which in several respects does not fit into accustomed patterns and therefore causes discussion far out of proportion to its numbers. They may also help us understand the factors which mediate between the formal economic "push" and "pull" of so many migration studies.

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# OCCUPATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN MENTAL DISORDERS

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The relationship between occupational prestige, socio-economic status, and psychosis has been previously studied and reported by Clark, (1,2) Nolan, (6) Fuson, (3) Tietze, Lemkau, and Cooper. (8) The findings of the last five authors support the position that rates for schizophrenia are greater in the lower socio-economic groups than in the higher socio-economic groups. Clark, in two separate reports, points out that occupational psychoses rates are patterned in the direction of an inverse relationship between psychoses rates and factors of occupational income and occupational prestige.

## THE PRESENT STUDY: SAMPLE AND METHOD

This study was concerned with the analysis of occupational histories of 1,000 United States Air Force Officers and enlisted men from World War II;\* white and colored, between the ages 16-44, who were referred to a mental hygiene clinic between May, 1943 and April, 1944. (7) Said persons were psychiatrically screened and classified in accordance with U. S. Army medical rules and regulations. Of the 1,000 men studied, 178 were diagnosed as having no mental disease; the remaining 822 were classified in the three major psychiatric categories of psychosis, psychoneurosis and psychopathic personality. Psychiatric classification of the personnel of 1,000 resulted in the following statistics: no mental disease, 178 (17.8%); mild psychoneurosis, 170 (17.0%); severe psychoneurosis;

440 (44.0%); psychosis, 64 (6.4%) (62 were schizophrenic); C. P. S. (constitutional psychopathic state — inadequate personality) 120 (12.0%); and C.P.S. (sexual inversion), 28 (2.8%). Civilian occupational data were transferred to punch cards and statistically analyzed. The statistical analysis consisted of comparing a diagnosed group in a particular occupational category with the remaining sample in that particular occupational category, in order to determine the significance of difference.\*\* A second step consisted of classifying each statistically significant occupational category according to degree of occupational prestige.

## This Study Differs From Previously Reported Studies in the Following Ways:

1. The sample was drawn from all of the traditional psychiatric categories rather than from one.
2. The sample was exclusively a non-hospitalized population representing a number of different cultural regions and socio-economic statuses found in the United States.

\*\*It would have been most desirable to compute the statistical significance of every pair of percentages that a table can yield, when each category is compared with every other category in turn. However, such a statistical procedure would have been prohibitively expensive and impractical in view of the magnitude of the study. Therefore, each social background category was compared for significance only with the remaining total sample. For example, the percentage diagnosed as having No Mental Disease in a subgroup having a particular social background, was compared for significance with the percent so diagnosed in the total sample.

\*The N of 1,000 is a 100 percent sample including all cases processed during the 13 month history of the clinic.

3. The analysis was concerned with the occupational differences between a No Mental Disease group and the remaining psychiatric categories of a particular occupational category; as well as differences between a single psychiatric category and the remaining sample of a particular occupational category.

#### The Purpose of the Present Study

1. To compare the results of previous research and social theory concerned with occupational differences and psychoses rates with the results of the present sample. In this regard the following hypotheses were tested; the hypotheses were derived

from the reported research discussed earlier.

**Hypothesis A:** In this clinical sample persons diagnosed as psychotic will rank high in civilian occupations having low prestige.

**Hypothesis B:** In this sample persons diagnosed as psychotic will rank low in civilian occupations having high prestige.

2. To compare the No Mental Disease category with the remaining categories for occupational differences.
3. To observe occupational differences, if any, among the additional psychiatric categories of psychoneurosis and psychopathic personality, including sexual inversion.

#### THE RESULTS

TABLE I.

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY AND PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS OF 1,000  
U. S. AIR FORCE ENLISTED AND OFFICER PERSONNEL<sup>1</sup>

Psychiatric Diagnosis	OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY <sup>2</sup>								
	Professional Managerial	Clerical And Sales	Service	Agriculture	Skilled	Semi-skilled	Unskilled	Odd Jobs	Student
	n = 119	n = 183	n = 34	n = 47	n = 197	n = 115	n = 96	n = 96	n = 105
No Mental Disease	21.9	21.8	11.8	28.7	15.3	14.8	12.5	9.4	23.8
Psychoneurosis-mild	21.0	12.7	11.8	21.3	21.8	13.9	15.6	16.7	15.2
Psychoneurosis-severe	36.1	51.1	35.3	31.9	50.3	35.7	43.8	41.7	49.5
Psychosis	8.4	3.2	5.9	4.2	3.0	10.4	11.5	12.5	2.9
C.P.S.-inadequate-personality	9.2	6.4	17.6	14.9	9.6	23.5	15.6	18.7	3.8
C.P.S.-sexual inversion	3.4	4.8	17.6	.0	1.7	1.7	1.0	1.0	4.8

<sup>1</sup> Information was not available for one case of No Mental Disease, one of Psychoneurosis-mild and one of C.P.S.-inadequate personality.

<sup>2</sup> The occupational categories used were suggested by the U. S. Department of Labor and U. S. Employment Service, *Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Part II, Group Arrangement of Occupational Titles and Codes*, Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1939, pp. ix-330.

<sup>3</sup> Odd jobs refers to patients who held numerous jobs of less than one year's duration.

TABLE II.  
STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES FOR OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY  
AND PRESTIGE RATINGS

Diagnosis	Category	Level of Per- Inci- Signifi- Prestige cent dence cance Ratings
No Mental Disease	Agriculture	27.7 High .05 Intermediate
No Mental Disease	Odd Jobs	9.4 Low .05 Low
Psychosis	Unskilled	11.5 High .05 Low
Psychosis	Odd Jobs	12.5 High .05 Low
C.P.S.-inadequate personality	Clerical and Sales	6.4 Low .05 Intermediate
C.P.S.-inadequate personality	Semi-skilled	23.5 High .003 Low
C.P.S.-inadequate personality	Odd Jobs	18.7 High .05 Low
C.P.S.-inadequate personality	Student	3.8 Low .05 Intermediate
C.P.S.-sexual inversion	Service	17.6 High .003 Intermediate
C.P.S.-sexual inversion	Skilled	.0 Low .05 Intermediate

1 Occupational prestige ratings were converted from numerical ratings by the writer, and these ratings were derived from Mapheus Smith, "An Empirical Scale of Prestige Status of Occupations," *American Sociological Review*, 8 (April, 1943), 185-192. Numerical ratings of 10 and 20 were termed high prestige occupations; 30, 40, 50 were termed intermediate prestige occupations; 60-100 low prestige occupations.

2 In view of the total N for C.P.S.-sexual inversion in this sample (28) the results must be viewed with caution. The diagnosis C.P.S.-sexual inversion is significantly high for persons in service occupations (intermediate prestige) and significantly low for skilled worker (intermediate prestige). Of interest here is the relationship between occupational role requirements and subsequent deviancy, a potentially significant area for further investigation.

This study attempts to arrive at no basic causal relationships. Inferences will be drawn and suggestions made regarding possible relationships between occupational differences and mental illness. A systematic analysis of causal relationships involves another analysis with a series of appropriate hypotheses. Implicit however are the following general propositions:

1. That low prestige occupations attract the personally maladjusted because personal and social requirements are at a minimum.
2. That low prestige occupations contribute to the development of personal maladjustment.
3. That incidence of mental illness and low occupational prestige are manifestations of other variables.

### Psychosis

An inspection of the results in Table 2 suggests that Hypothesis A is substantiated. Thus persons diagnosed as psychotic will rank high in civilian occupations having low prestige.

Hypothesis B, however, is not borne out by the data. Thus persons diagnosed as psychotic will not rank low in civilian occupations having high prestige. This suggests that psychotics (schizophrenics) in this sample are statistically represented, consistent with the expected number, in occupations having high occupational prestige. How may these results be explained? The following statements are offered as possible explanations: It is to be noted at the outset that these results suggest that psychotics (schizophren-

ics) are not homogeneous, but are invariably in different stages of illness and remission. This raises questions regarding the adequacy of samples drawn from mental institutions, and the need of studying non-hospitalized schizophrenics in order to uncover significant data regarding the sociological nature of schizophrenia. Of equal import is the proposition that some schizophrenics are able to function in responsible positions by integrating psychotic reactions with their occupational roles. If this assumption is valid, might it be that schizophrenics can be made more socially productive by analyzing the social psychological adjustments which non-hospitalized schizophrenics have been able to make to occupational requirements and roles? Finally, one must raise the question of the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis. Is the diagnosis of schizophrenia a variable one, dependent on the particular psychiatric orientation of the examiner?

#### No Mental Disease

The diagnosis No Mental Disease is significantly high in the present sample for persons in agriculture, an occupation of intermediate prestige. Reasons for the low incidence of mental disease for persons in agriculture are speculative, but have been suggested as being indirectly related to occupation and directly related to the quality of group life (primary-secondary relationships) and resultant personality development. (5)

#### C.P.S. INADEQUATE PERSONALITY

The diagnosis C.P.S., inadequate personality, is significantly high in the present sample for semi-skilled and odd jobs (low occupational prestige) and significantly low for clerical-sales and students (intermediate occupational prestige). These findings indicate clearly the

association between low occupational prestige and C.P.S., inadequate personality. Among men in the category of C.P.S., inadequate personality, the low rate of "clerical-sales" is especially worthy of note since such positions require regularity in attendance and conformity to regulations. The inability of the psychopathic personality to conform has been discussed from the standpoint of deficiency in role playing (internalization of social norms), and related inability to develop a capacity for empathy.

#### SUMMARY

The present study is designed to re-examine some of the evidence relating to psychosis, occupational differences and occupational prestige in the light of additional research material. The analysis suggests that (A) persons diagnosed as psychotic will rank high in civilian occupations having low prestige. The converse, (B) that persons diagnosed as psychotic will rank low in civilian occupations having high prestige is not borne out. Reasons for this are suggested as centering around the nature of the sample, variability of diagnosis, and the differential occupational adjustments which psychotics make. Additional findings and interpretations regarding occupational categories and psychiatric categories of No Mental Disease and C.P.S. inadequate personality were also noted.

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## THE INFLUENCE OF PEER GROUPS UPON ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FEMININE ROLE\*

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This paper, a pilot study, is concerned with the effect of peer groups on changing attitudes. There are two main objectives to this exploratory work: 1. That it will lead eventually to a series of inquiries into the areas of conflict, real or potential, which arise as a result of attempted adherence to divergent social norms. 2. That it will lead to quantitative substantiation for some of the now assumed sociological generalizations. For example, there has been presented, implicitly as well as explicitly, an emphasis to the effect that the roles which individuals play in married life, like other roles, have been previously learned. In addition there is the emphasis, in Burgess and Locke to cite one case, that the roles learned prior to marriage are learned in terms of broad generalizations which are then expressed in terms of specific social norms. (1) In other words, the individual first learns specific

patterns of behavior and the concomitant attitudes, both of which are later incorporated into the particular social norm.

It has also been traditionally accepted that the roles which an individual learns in the family milieu are most important in determining the individual's later behavior. It is usually assumed that the child identifies himself with the parent of the same sex, and thus acquires the attitudes and expectancies which contribute to the individual's acceptance of the cultural norms and role behavior.

There is also evidence that some learning is acquired from the individual's peer group. Divergence in norms and attitudes between those of the familial group and the peer group may, however, create conflict situations for the individual. Stouffer's article, while dealing primarily with methodology, points up this possible divergence. (5) Though the author apparently accepts it as a matter of fact, the evidence for the assumption is lacking. In a widely quoted article, (4) Margaret Mead discusses the

\*Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society, held in Berkeley, California, August 30, 31, September 1, 1953.

potential inconsistency between family and peer group; unfortunately, little scientific evidence is offered for the existence of the inconsistency.

In the light of the above, there are three separate, but related questions raised which this research attempts to investigate:

*One.* Are the norms of the individual's own family of more importance to the individual than those of his peer group.\* In other words, are the earliest roles and attitudes the roles which continue to be of prime importance to him in the process of continued interaction outside of the family circle?

*Two.* Related to the first, is the question: are the norms of the individual's family different from the norms of his peer group? That is to say, are there actually two sets of norms, a familial set and a peer group set, which may be divergent and which may be a potential source of conflict? The literature in the field suggests this is true; quantitative evidence is lacking. The corollary here is the question of the "conflict of ages."

*Three.* Is there a time differential involved in the acceptance of norms and concomitant attitudes? That is to say, if one compares three groups of different ages, would one find an increased acceptance of peer group norms with a decreased acceptance of family norms; or would the reverse be true? In either case, would there be a potential source of intra-family conflict, to say nothing of personal conflict for the individual? A corollary question is: if the divergence appears, when does it become important to the individual?

\*"Importance" in this usage means in terms of acceptance of the norms as his own, and carries with it the connotation of identification.

# THE STUDY

The present study attempts to explore, at three different age-grade levels, the individual's awareness of, and conceptions of, differences and similarities between his attitudes and those of his parents and peers with regard to the feminine role.\*\*

The theoretical frame of reference for this study is essentially a socio-psychological one. It adheres more closely to a Dewey-Mead-Cooley approach to explanations of human behavior than to a synthetic biological-psychological frame. It is a basic assumption of the writer, for example, that an individual's role, and the relationship of his role to a complementary role, is contingent upon (a) his conception of his own attitudes; (b) the definition of the situation that he accepts; and (c) the degree of consensus between his own attitudes and those he attributes to others. Role, in this sense, is used as a synonym for delimited behavior in a specific situation or relationship. Attitudes are simply acquired verbal re-

\*\*Attitudes toward the role women are permitted to play in the family specifically and the society in general is only one area which will eventually be explored. Conflicting norms regarding permissive and non-permissive sexual behavior, the "romantic complex," and levels of occupational aspirations are some of the other areas which need investigation. In all of these, as well as others, an individual as a member of two groups, playing different roles, may well be faced with incompatible and ambiguous norms. Some specific aspects of the larger problem have already been examined by the many adequate studies of language difficulties of second generation children, and by the study of the marginal positions of the foreman in industry, the non-commissioned officer in the army, *et cetera*. Likewise some areas of adolescent behavior have been investigated with signal success (e. g., juvenile crime and juvenile sex offenses); but with the exception of a few studies, most have been concerned with enumeration of the data.

sponses, to a variety of stimuli, learned in the social milieu.

**Research and Hypotheses:** In the study 350 respondents were originally used; 28 cases were later discarded for various reasons—primarily incomplete returns. All of the subjects were lower socioeconomic class; the gross family incomes ranged from \$500 to one case of \$2800 per annum. (2) The three age-grades used were: a pre-adolescent group, which included subjects from 11 to 13 years of age, 51 males, 56 females; adolescent, 15 to 18 years of age, 58 males, 50 females; post-adolescent, 20 to 24 years of age, 53 males, 54 females. Random sampling of every seventh case was possible in the first two age-grades as these subjects were drawn from urban schools within a two hundred mile radius of the writer's home. The population in the third age-grade was contacted through, but did not include, students in an extension class in an urban community within the same radius. All subjects were single, white and Protestant.

From the above sample, data were gathered to bear upon the following hypotheses: 1. Similarities in the attitudes of ego, and those attributed to parents and peers represent identification with and acceptance of previously learned attitudes. Conversely, differences in attitudes attributed to parents and peers represents a shift away from the importance of the family in the process of learning social norms on the part of ego. 2. The influence of the peer group attitudes on the feminine role begins to have effect in the early adolescent years—effect in terms of contradiction of and divergence from earlier expressed attitudes. 3. The influence of the individual's conception of peer group attitudes is in direct propor-

tion to the length of the post-adolescent years. Conversely, the influence of earlier learned attitudes lessens as the individual participates in peer group relationships with greater frequency and intensity. 4. The most significant sex difference in attitudes toward the feminine role will occur in the adolescent years where peer group identification is most intense. Conversely, the least significant sex difference will appear in the pre-adolescent years where parental influence is strongest.

Kirkpatrick's "A Belief-Pattern Scale for Measuring Attitudes Toward Feminism" (Form A) was revised so as to make 23 pairs of questions concerning permissive behavior and concomitant attitudes, with a vocabulary of sufficient ease for the youngest informants. (3) Each question was answered by the respondent as to (a) his own attitudes, (b) (as he put himself in the place of others) his conceptions of the attitudes of the parent of the same sex (Pas), (c) his conceptions of the attitudes of the parent of the opposite sex (Pos), and (d) his conceptions of the attitudes of his peers. Each section of the scale was given on different days with sufficient time gaps between to permit "forgetting" of the previous scoring.

Each of the four parts of the scale were scored algebraically, and could range from -46, indicating extremely permissive attitudes toward feminism, to +46, indicating no permissive attitudes toward feminism. The actual range of raw scores was from -34 to +35. Each of the age-grades were used in pre-testing but the results were not included in this study. Although the Kirkpatrick Scale had been proven both valid and reliable, the adaptation of the scale necessitated further assurance. The S-B test of reliability

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identification of ego with his peer group. The same is true for fey-ielded a coefficient of .83 with a S.E. of .014, which compares favorably with the original study by Kirkpatrick. Validity was attempted by the use of intensive interviews with the subjects randomly drawn from the sample. The Critical Ratio was used as a test of significance with a C.R. of 3 as being significant. The minus sign in some of the C.R.'s is due to the algebraic scoring.

*Findings.* The statistical results of the four parts of the scale given

to each respondent are shown in Table I. In the first age-grade it was surprising, to the writer at least, to note the degree of permissiveness toward feminism found among these lower class males as indicated by the mean score of -2.5. The comparatively low positive scores at the other two age-grades, together with the above, certainly does not coincide with the stereotyped picture of lower class emphasis on hyper-masculine values. For males in the first age-grade, the high critical ratio is taken as indication of the lack of

TABLE I  
TABLE OF AGE-GRADES, MEANS AND CRITICAL RATIOS FOR 322 SUBJECTS

	No.	Sex	Mean*	C. R. #
1. Pre-Adol. 11-13 yrs.	51	M	1. — 2.5 2. 3.9 3. — 4.5 4. — 4.65	2. 7 3. —10 4. —10.8
1. Pre-Adol. 11-13 yrs.	56	F	1. — 7.95 2. — 5 3. 3.45 4. — 6.3	2. —13.4 3. —21.3 4. — 7.5
2. Adoles. 15-18 yrs.	58	M	1. 7.25 2. 2.6 3. —11.2 4. 7.05	2. 24.4 3. — 6.6 4. 1
2. Adoles. 15-18 yrs.	50	F	1. — 4.9 2. —10.1 3. 2.6 4. — 4.3	2. —26 3. —10.9 4. — 2.3
3. Post-Adol. 20-24 yrs.	53	M	1. 8.95 2. 9.15 3. — 7.1 4. 7.7	2. 1 3. 8 4. 1.8
3. Post-Adol. 20-24 yrs.	54	F	1. — 5.3 2. — 4.9 3. 9.35 4. — 5.65	2. — 1.9 3. 10.2 4. — 1.6

\*Mean 1. Self  
2. Pas  
3. Pos  
4. Peer

#C. R. 2. Self-Pas  
3. Self-Pos  
4. Self-Peer

Minus mean scores indicate permissive attitudes toward feminism;  
Plus mean scores indicate non-permissive attitudes toward feminism.

males in the first age-grade. For both sexes there is significant divergence between the subject's conception of the feminine role and the concomitant attitudes and those of parents of both sexes.

In the second age-grade the C.R. of 1.0 for males and peers and of -2.3 for females and peers indicate the effect of peer groups upon attitudes toward feminism and the growing divergence between potentially conflicting norms. For both males and females there is significant difference between their own attitudes and those attributed to both parents. The highest C.R.'s between Self and Pas (parent of the same sex) are found in this age-grade. Family conflict has a high potential.

In the third age-grade, the only significant C.R.'s are found between Self and Pos (parent of the opposite sex), for males, 8 and for females 10.2. For both males and females in this age level, the C.R.'s between Self and Peer and between Self and Pas remain on the level of chance. For males, there is a trend back to the masculine, anti-feminine attitudes which were consistently attributed to their fathers.

The imputation of divergent attitudes on the part of the individual with regard to parents and peers is certainly important in terms of analyzing the behavior of the individual and accounting for much of the real or potential conflict.\* For example, the adolescent

females with a mean score of -4.5 indicated a significantly different set of attitudes for their mothers (mean score -10.1). Item analysis helped clarify this. To illustrate, in scoring the statement, "It is naturally proper for parents to keep a daughter, on the average, under closer control than a son," 86% of the cases, or 43 subjects, disagreed. However, 82% scored the statement to indicate agreement in terms of mother's attitudes. But lest one assume the subjects' scoring of the scale in terms of peer group attitudes to be mere repetition, or projection, of their own attitudes, it may be shown that for this same group of subjects in scoring the statement, "Women should have the right to compete with men for jobs," 88% agreed. Only 58% indicated agreement on this item when checking in terms of peer group attitudes.

In the adolescent and post-adolescent groups, for both males and females, there was some indication of consistent inconsistency in scoring some of the statements. The statement, "Women have as much right to have pre-marital sex relations, as men" was acceptable to 75% of the adolescent males and 85% of the post adolescent males. The statement, "The unmarried mother is morally a greater failure than the unmarried father," was found agreeable to 87% of the adolescent males and 84% of the post-adolescent males. To say there is a slight male bias, and something of an inconsistency here, is perhaps an understatement.\*\*

\*These same figures, however, may be interpreted to represent further evidence of the inherent validity of the conflicting norms and values of our culture, or as representative of what has been termed "our schizoid culture." In this light though the figures may represent male bias, and certainly an anti-feminine attitude, they cannot actually be called inconsistent.

\*The point may be raised, for example, that actually the peer group was not subjected to the scale. The 47 interviews conducted to ascertain the validity of the scale included 18 cases where both the subject and his two closest friends had scored the scale. These 54 schedules were analyzed separately, as well as with the rest of the sample. There were no significant differences in Self-Peer critical ratios for these 54 cases when compared with 54 other cases randomly selected where ostensibly their closest friends had not been included.



In addition to the four parts of the scale, the subjects also filled out a data sheet which yielded much information of value in the interviews. For example, in answer to the question, "Have you ever felt that you could discuss things better with your friends than you could with your parents?", 61% of the males in the first age-grade answered "yes"; 90% in the second, and 76% in the third. For females, the percentages were 55, 93 and 72 respectively. For both sexes the peak of peer group identification was the second age-grade, and in neither case did the percentages of the third age-grade drop below that of the first.

In answering the question, "Have you ever felt that your parents do not understand you as well as your friends?", the percentages of "yes" for males in the three age levels were 59, 88 and 77 respectively; for females in answer to the same question 54%, 89% and 74%.

The twenty-three pairs of questions were divided into four basic categories dealing with feminine and anti-feminine propositions. There were statements concerning legal-political rights, family authority and status, sexual behavior and morality, and some statements of a primarily economic nature. The latter propositions were the best discriminators of permissive and non-permissive attitudes toward the feminine role. In responding to the statement, "There should always be equal pay for equal work for both men and women," there was a clear demarcation of the acceptability of the proposition. The figures for Self and Peer Group are shown in Table II.

Table II

Age grade	Sex	% Agreed-Self	% Agreed-Peer
I	M	35	39
	F	89	70
II	M	28	24
	F	90	92
III	M	30	26
	F	91	87

Responding to the statement, "Women should have the right to compete with men for jobs," the adolescent females indicated 58% agreement in terms of peer group attitudes; to the statement above, 92%. This interesting discrepancy is somewhat puzzling unless it is taken to mean that, in terms of peer group attitudes, women have the right to compete for jobs but should not receive the same pay for them as men.

#### CONCLUSIONS

*One.* The differences in attitudes attributed to parents by the subjects indicates a shift away from the importance of the family in the process of acquiring the attitudes and behavior concomitant to social norms. With the sample given in this study, this divergence away from the importance of the family patterns occurs as early as eleven to thirteen years of age. The first hypothesis is substantiated by the data obtained.

*Two.* The second hypothesis, dealing with the conceptions of peer groups and the changing attitudes is likewise substantiated for this sample. One possible exception, mentioned above, is that the influence of the peer group may be noted much earlier than the period of adolescence as originally hypothesized. In fact, in the first age-grade the difference in attitudes between self and peer group was also significant. How-

males in the first age-grade. For both sexes there is significant divergence between the subject's conception of the feminine role and the concomitant attitudes and those of parents of both sexes.

In the second age-grade the C.R. of 1.0 for males and peers and of -2.3 for females and peers indicate the effect of peer groups upon attitudes toward feminism and the growing divergence between potentially conflicting norms. For both males and females there is significant difference between their own attitudes and those attributed to both parents. The highest C.R.'s between Self and Pas (parent of the same sex) are found in this age-grade. Family conflict has a high potential.

In the third age-grade, the only significant C.R.'s are found between Self and Pos (parent of the opposite sex), for males, 8 and for females 10.2. For both males and females in this age level, the C.R.'s between Self and Peer and between Self and Pas remain on the level of chance. For males, there is a trend back to the masculine, anti-feminine attitudes which were consistently attributed to their fathers.

The imputation of divergent attitudes on the part of the individual with regard to parents and peers is certainly important in terms of analyzing the behavior of the individual and accounting for much of the real or potential conflict.\* For example, the adolescent

females with a mean score of -4.9 indicated a significantly different set of attitudes for their mothers (mean score -10.1). Item analysis helped clarify this. To illustrate, in scoring the statement, "It is naturally proper for parents to keep a daughter, on the average, under closer control than a son," 86% of the cases, or 43 subjects, disagreed. However, 82% scored the statement to indicate agreement in terms of mother's attitudes. But, lest one assume the subjects' scoring of the scale in terms of peer group attitudes to be mere repetition, or projection, of their own attitudes, it may be shown that for this same group of subjects in scoring the statement, "Women should have the right to compete with men for jobs," 88% agreed. Only 58% indicated agreement on this item when checking in terms of peer group attitudes.

In the adolescent and post-adolescent groups, for both males and females, there was some indication of consistent inconsistency in scoring some of the statements. The statement, "Women have as much right to have pre-marital sex relations, as men" was acceptable to 75% of the adolescent males and 85% of the post-adolescent males. The statement, "The unmarried mother is morally a greater failure than the unmarried father," was found agreeable to 87% of the adolescent males and 84% of the post-adolescent males. To say there is a slight male bias, and something of an inconsistency here, is perhaps an understatement.\*\*

\*\*These same figures, however, may be interpreted to represent further evidence of the inherent validity of the conflicting norms and values of our culture, or are representative of what has been termed "our schizoid culture." In this light though the figures may represent male bias, and certainly an anti-feminine attitude, they cannot actually be called inconsistent.

\*The point may be raised, for example, that actually the peer group was not subjected to the scale. The 47 interviews conducted to ascertain the validity of the scale included 18 cases where both the subject and his two closest friends had scored the scale. These 54 schedules were analyzed separately, as well as with the rest of the sample. There were no significant differences in Self-Peer critical ratios for these 54 cases when compared with 54 other cases randomly selected where ostensibly their closest friends had not been included.

In addition to the four parts of the scale, the subjects also filled out a data sheet which yielded much information of value in the interviews. For example, in answer to the question, "Have you ever felt that you could discuss things better with your friends than you could with your parents?", 61% of the males in the first age-grade answered "yes"; 90% in the second, and 76% in the third. For females, the percentages were 55, 93 and 72 respectively. For both sexes the peak of peer group identification was the second age-grade, and in neither case did the percentages of the third age-grade drop below that of the first.

In answering the question, "Have you ever felt that your parents do not understand you as well as your friends?", the percentages of "yes" for males in the three age levels were 59, 88 and 77 respectively; for females in answer to the same question 54%, 89% and 74%.

The twenty-three pairs of questions were divided into four basic categories dealing with feminine and anti-feminine propositions. There were statements concerning legal-political rights, family authority and status, sexual behavior and morality, and some statements of a primarily economic nature. The latter propositions were the best discriminators of permissive and non-permissive attitudes toward the feminine role. In responding to the statement, "There should always be equal pay for equal work for both men and women," there was a clear demarcation of the acceptability of the proposition. The figures for Self and Peer Group are shown in Table II.

Table II

Age grade	Sex	% Agreed-Self	% Agreed-Peer
I	M	35	39
	F	89	70
II	M	28	24
	F	90	92
III	M	30	26
	F	91	87

Responding to the statement, "Women should have the right to compete with men for jobs," the adolescent females indicated 58% agreement in terms of peer group attitudes; to the statement above, 92%. This interesting discrepancy is somewhat puzzling unless it is taken to mean that, in terms of peer group attitudes, women have the right to compete for jobs but should not receive the same pay for them as men.

#### CONCLUSIONS

*One.* The differences in attitudes attributed to parents by the subjects indicates a shift away from the importance of the family in the process of acquiring the attitudes and behavior concomitant to social forms. With the sample given in this study, this divergence away from the importance of the family patterns occurs as early as eleven to thirteen years of age. The first hypothesis is substantiated by the data obtained.

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ever it is possible that the C.R. at the first age level represents the individual faced with two divergent sets of norms and attitudes — the earlier of the two, the parental norms are being cast aside, and the more recent, the peer norms, are not yet internalized. It is evident from this study that two sets of norms are being presented to the subject in early adolescence. It is to be recognized that a sample of subjects drawn exclusively from middle or upper class environments may alter this picture considerably.

*Three.* The third hypothesis, the influence of the individual's conception of peer group attitudes is in direct proportion to the length of the post-adolescent years, is substantiated for this sample of lower class subjects. There is no evidence of significant differences occurring between the individual's conception of the attitudes of his peer group and his own for the adolescent and post - adolescent age-grades. Whether frequency of contact or intensity of the interpersonal relationships enters the picture, and to what extent it should be controlled, is difficult to say. A measure of frequency of self-peer contact was attempted during the interviews and was not adequate. Intensity of opinion as well as intensity of contact was also attempted; both were unsatisfactory.\*

*Four.* The fourth hypothesis was found to be unsatisfactory. The greatest sex difference occurred in the post-adolescent group; and coincides with the differences in attitudes attributed to both parents by the subjects of that age-

grade.

*Five.* For males there was an increasing masculine, or unfavorable, attitude toward feminism in the trend of male mean scores from -2.5 through 7.25 to 8.95. Similarly, for the males' conceptions of their peer groups, the trend of mean scores was from -4.65 through 7.05 to 7.7. This might possibly negate the Freudian emphasis on the Oedipus complex as one would anticipate the reverse if there were identification with mother and rejection of father.

Most studies of this nature pose more problems for the researcher than are actually solved; this study is no exception. Although a longitudinal study in which the investigator follows the same sample of subjects through a given time span would undoubtedly result in greater validity and would permit greater generalization in terms of the sample, and the universe from which it is drawn, this scientific ideal was not possible in this pilot study. The three age-grades reported here did show demonstrable conflicting attitudes toward the feminine role, as an illustration of a social norm, resulting from increased identification with their peer groups. The original thesis of the effect of the individual's relationship to his peer groups on his changing attitudes is supported.\*\*

\*A cogent criticism by Wellman J. Warner, in personal conversation, offers the substitute hypothesis of discontinuities present in the learning of attitudes toward the feminine role and negates the effect of the peer group. The evidence for Dr. Warner's remarks can be ascertained by emphasis upon the algebraic signs of the mean scores ( - or + ). With the exception of the pre-adolescent males, both sexes in all age-grades indicated similar degrees of permissive or non-permissive attitudes for Self and Parent (parent of the same sex).

\*Intensity of opinion was attempted by asking the respondent to double check those statements about which he felt most strongly. Of the 322 cases only 21 double-checked any items. The mean number of double-checked items was 2.1.

## REFERENCES

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2. Where the father was still living, whether employed or not, his occupation was used as a check on socio-economic status. If the father was not living, mother's occupation was used. See A. M. Edwards, *Comparative Occupation Statistics*, U. S., 1870-1940, 16th Census, Washington, D. C.: United States Bureau of the Census, 1943, p. 179.
3. For a discussion of the construction of the original scale and the conceptual analysis see Clifford Kirkpatrick, "Construction of a Belief-Pattern Scale For Measuring Attitudes Toward Feminism," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 7 (1936), 421-437; Clifford Kirkpatrick, "Inconsistency in Attitudinal Behavior with Special Reference to Attitudes Toward Feminism," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 20 (1936), 535-552; also, Clifford Kirkpatrick, "The Content of a Scale for Measuring Attitudes Toward Feminism," *Sociology and Social Research*, 20 (1935-36), 512-526.
4. Margaret Mead, "Social Change and Cultural Surrogates," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, 14 (1940), 92-110. Mead's thesis is that peer groups may stand in loco parentis to the individual and substitute standards for him. The result may be real or potential conflict. For an early work in this area, see Caroline McConn Tryon, *Evaluations of Adolescent Personality by Adolescents*, Washington, D.C.: 1939, National Research Council.
5. Samuel A. Stouffer, "An Analysis of Conflicting Social Norms," *American Sociological Review*, 14 (1949), 707-717.

## BOOK REVIEWS

*Social Thought from Hammurabi to Comte*. By ROLLIN CHAMBLISS, New York: The Dryden Press, 1954. x, 469 pp. \$5.00.

A well-written, well-organized introduction to social thought for college students. Though apparently designed for one semester, it could easily be expanded to two; many excerpts from original and secondary sources invite the inquiring student to use the excellent bibliography. Good index and good book-making, a joy to the hand and eye.

Book reviewers often criticize an author for the book he didn't write which the reviewer thinks he should have written. Chambliss removes this temptation by stating clearly what he is trying to do, and why — and does it very well.

On the sound principle that comprehension should precede criticism, Chambliss tries to present each writer sympathetically. He believes there is more validity, more present utility, in the ideas of ancient social and of ancient physical-biological thinkers. "For the present, however, many old ideas have lost none of their vitality, and it may be that they never will" (p. 3). This I doubt. I think the "vitality" of many "old ideas" are a major factor in producing our present

confusion and tragedy. One of the chief values in studying the history of social thought, to my mind, is to show how much of it is still "vital" but inadequate and even irrelevant today. Chambliss might agree but still argue that this should become evident after the student has learned what the questionable "old ideas" really are — a sound idea if it is remembered that most students will not see it unless it is specifically called to their attention.

After clearly distinguishing between social thought and social history, he presents his general framework: brief historical background for each chapter, a biographical sketch of the men chosen, their major works, their methods, views of human nature and social institutions, ideas of social organization and social change, and basic values. His criteria for selecting men include availability of the original writings in English, that the men chosen have a coherent system of thought relative to important phases of social behavior, that these thoughts should be timely and "living," and that works considered should be recognized "masterpieces."

He uses this schema to discuss five ancient societies: Babylonia, Ancient Egypt, Confucian China, Ancient India,



and the Hebrews. He concludes with eight men: Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Khaldun, Locke, Vico, and Comte. A chapter is devoted to Roman thinkers, mainly Polybius, Lucretius, Cicero, and Seneca—too briefly, I think; and a chapter to the Renaissance—Reformation thinkers, mainly da Vinci (too little) and Luther (too much). Machiavelli, More, Erasmus, Montaigne, Calvin, and Bodin are mentioned. I'd like to see more about some of these men and less about Plato, Augustine, and Aquinas whom I regard as greatly overrated though they have greatly influenced western social thought, mostly to its detriment, as is also the case with Luther and Calvin. However, I now am getting close to criticizing Chambliss for the book he didn't write.

It is an error to say Augustine was born more than a century after the first Christian Emperor died (p. 249), if Constantine (d. 338) was that emperor as I always have understood. Also (p. 259), the split of the Eastern and Western Church is usually given as 1054 rather than 1472.

He sometimes seems to depart from his principle of "sympathetic presentation." For example, he seems to rate Plato higher than Aristotle and to "downgrade" the Romans, especially Seneca and Cicero, and also Heraclitus, Democritus, and Lucretius. The mystics seem to get more "sympathetic" treatment than the realists. Seneca is criticized for merely "deploring" slavery while Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas receive no negative appraisal for their attitudes toward slavery which they regarded as "natural," if not indeed necessary. Also Seneca's " . . . crusade for personal morality lacks the fortifying power . . . of belief in immortality" (p. 218). Actually, it is this aspect of Seneca's thought which is still vital and therefore important by Chambliss' own criteria, as are the ideas of Arius, Pelagius, Donatus, et al., and the Atomists, which are scarcely mentioned.

Stress on the vitality of Augustine's ideas is misplaced emphasis to my mind. He was a "great influence" but mainly a negative one. His ideas have steadily been losing their vitality for the last five hundred years. He himself was a sin-sick mother-fixated, paranoid character who wedded the Church and State (cf. the slaughter of the Donatists), promoted the temporal power of the Church which resulted in the death and exploitation of millions, made the Great Schism inevitable, and fixed in the theology of the Western Church the mystical other-worldliness based on revelation, original sin,

miracles, personal salvationism, legalistic ritualism, primitive minded non-logic-experimental thinking, and the hierarchic authoritarianism from which it has not yet wholly recovered. If Arius had won at Nicea and Augustine had devoted his great talents to promoting a non-mystical, non-ecclesiastical, non-authoritarian version of Christianity, the age of science might have dawned a thousand years earlier and the present anarchic-authoritarian disunity of Christianity might not have occurred.

However, these are vain speculations. Christianity is what it is and presumably Augustine and others are at least partially responsible for it. Good teachers and good students can use this book as a stepping stone for numerous similar critical evaluations and speculations. That they should do so is Chambliss' main concern. This is a sound idea, and his book is a good guide for such an approach to the history of social thought.

READ BAIN

Miami University  
Oxford, Ohio

*Dynamics of Groups at Work.* By HERBERT A. THELEN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. 379 pp. \$6.00.

This is an exciting book, the kind one ponders as one reads. Time and again. I have paused in reading to reflect on an idea, to turn it over, connect it up, weigh it, judge its worth. In general, the volume is well titled—the dynamics of groups at work. About half deals with what the author calls "technologies," the other half with "explanations," with a considerable (and helpful) overlap between Parts I and II. A bibliography of eleven titles includes the writings which have influenced the author—Bettelheim, Bion, Chase, A. Davis, De Huszar, Dewey, Frenkel-Brunswick, Hilliard, Jennings, Lewin, and Redl.

By technology the author means "a set of principles useful to bring about change toward a desired end." Part I via concrete cases of groups at work and groups in action, presents six technologies—rebuilding the community through citizen action, educating children through need-meeting activities, developing the school by means of faculty self-training administration and management through group responsibility and individual autonomy, and training for group participation by the laboratory method and the conduct of effective meetings. Each of these action programs is developed in a chapter, and any chapter might be used

to show the nature of the author's organization and thought.

There is substance in this book, a richness of examples and analyses which merits the attention of educators, social workers, civic leaders, as well as citizens in general. After some comments on urban growth and decline, we are given a concrete case, the Hyde Park-Kenwood district in Chicago. This is a stirring story of a developmental "block-type" program, a tale marked by hard-hitting realism with just enough glow to intrigue the reader, to capture his imagination. Next in the chapter are types of problems which any block in any urban transition area may well have to consider, and after this eight principles of team leadership are described. Other topics, such as leader recruitment, leader training, area services, and the significance of citizen participation in change-action programs are discussed subsequently.

Part II is concerned with six basic concepts — membership, integration, reality, control, leadership, and community. The intent is to use these key concepts in explaining what people do, how they feel, what they say and refuse to say, with heavy and unvarying stress on human feelings. But otherwise, Thelen organizes a set of ideas for thinking about group problem-solving, freeing these terms from their traditional fuzziness and sharpening them for practical use. He writes with an explicit moral aim — that of using science to better the human lot.

All in all, I would strongly recommend this book. It is a happy blend of concrete experience and analytical theory, well seasoned with commonsense and insight. As a classroom text, I think, it is best suited for advanced students. It should find general use in group dynamics workshops.

LLOYD ALLEN COOK

Wayne University

*The Nature of Prejudice.* By GORDON W. ALLPORT. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1954. xviii, 537 pp. \$5.50.

So great is the interest in the problem of prejudice that perhaps more scientific writing has appeared on this subject in the last decade or two than in any other similar period in the past. Gordon W. Allport, in addition to gathering much of the data and contributing impressively to the theory, has now tackled the job of organizing in this comprehensive volume a mass of material, which, incidentally, he feels, will soon become obsolete because of the passion for in-

vestigation in this field.

The book is noteworthy in several respects. It is a model of the cross-disciplinary approach. Recognizing that we are faced with a problem of multiple causation (as we always are!), Professor Allport emphasizes the interplay of sociological and psychological factors. History, too, is necessary for a complete understanding; it is the historian (with psychological insight), for example, who tells us how and why the Jew came to be a scapegoat. The author does alert the reader (by frank admission as well as by space-allotment) to his own bias for psychology. "Unless mores somehow enter the fibre of individual lives they are not effective agents, for it is only individuals who can feel antagonism and practice discrimination." But for a full explanation of the field Allport calls on the sociologist and the historian as co-workers.

This volume will be well-received by instructors of ethnic (the word the author feels is more useful than "race") relations. All phenomena relevant to the problem are described and analyzed in refreshingly intelligible terms. The book is loaded with brief and interesting case studies which illustrate and clarify concepts. The literature seems to have been completely covered. Indeed, this exhaustiveness could conceivably present a problem to the instructor who wants to do more in the classroom than a rehash of the reading.

Social scientists may well be proud of the research they produced and which is so ably and comprehensively reviewed by Allport in one of the few fields which has had a direct impact in the direction of improving group relations in our society. Allport directs attention to the increasing use and usefulness of social science data, not only in the drafting of laws but also in eliciting favorable (anti-discriminatory) decisions from the courts. I have no doubt that the data presented in this volume were crucial in bringing about the Supreme Court decision banning segregation in the schools.

One of the most significant statements in this book, especially in view of the Supreme Court decision, is the author's refutation of Sumner's proposition that "stateways cannot change folkways." It may be true (as we are so often told) that you can't legislate against prejudice, but you can legislate against discrimination in employment, for example. This seems to lead to more equal-status contacts between members of diverse groups which in turn seem to lead to improved intergroup relations, i.e., less prejudice.

Allport, therefore, would predict that there will be an improvement in ethnic relations after the decision not only because it will widen the area of equal-status contacts but also because the decision (and FEPC legislation) "is in line with [our] own private consciences."

SIDNEY H. ARONSON

Brooklyn College

*Science and the Common Understanding.*

By J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1954. 96 pp. \$2.75.

Oppenheimer develops three major themes in this book. The first is the history of atomic physics from Rutherford to the present. The second is the impact of atomic physics on the Newtonian image of the world and on philosophy in general. The third is the nature of science and the role of the scientist in society. Naturally, it is in this latter theme that social scientists will be most interested.

Oppenheimer sees science, the scientist, and society as interrelated. The relationship is one of mutual responsibility. Science must justify its patronage by society; it must provide society with betterment. It must accept its own limits and its own ignorance with humility; it cannot, and must not speak with an authority that exceeds the boundaries of its own competence. It must recognize the existence of other valid kinds of knowledge beside its own. Society owes science an environment within which it can flourish. It owes it "incentives which are strong and secure . . . and all those freedoms which are incompatible with modern political tyranny . . ." (open access to knowledge, a belief in equality, liberty to resolve differences by converse, the right to form voluntary associations, of which the brotherhood of scientists is but one). The scientist must communicate his specialized knowledge to society in terms it can understand. He must do this to be correctly interpreted, to prevent the emergence of a technical elite removed from the public, and to provide scientists with the "threads which bind them in community and make them more than separate men." The scientist, while knowing that his work is rightly "both an instrument and an end" must remain uncorrupted in his search for the truth; he must preserve his "binding quiet faith . . . that knowledge is good and good in itself . . ." He must recognize the consequences of the power which his knowledge brings and must share in the common anxiety that this power be used

with wisdom and love of humanity. (The history of atomic physics " . . . has produced the most compelling argument of all for putting an end to war itself . . .") Finally, he must be a philosopher; he must discover what there is in his knowledge that is "particularly relevant, helpful, and inspiring to know." For Oppenheimer, atomic physics provides philosophy with an exemplification, an encouragement, and a refinement of old wisdom (i.e., Hinduism and the teachings of Buddha). It emphasizes that in life and the universe there is only change, growth, and decay, that new emergents constantly appear and fade, that unity is found in the contradiction of opposites, that contemplation of nature's truth is the purest joy, and that of the many approaches to truth science is only one.

The essays which comprise *Science and the Common Understanding* were originally given as lectures by Professor Oppenheimer over the BBC in late 1953. Delivered prior to his removal from government employment as a "security risk," the essays provide the reader with a measure of the man whom the officials involved in the case saw fit to discredit. The measure is impressive in every respect. Oppenheimer is revealed not only as an intellect of exorbitant talent, but as a sensitive and profoundly moral human being as well.

ARTHUR S. BARRON

Research Institute of America

*The Permanent Revolution in Science.*

By ROBERT L. SCHANCK. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954, xvi, 112 pp. \$3.00.

Mr. Schanck advances the provocative thesis that a common method has recently been emerging in the physical and social sciences. A description of the development of this new method in physics, chemistry, and biology is given in the first half of the book. The last half is principally devoted to showing how Freud and Karl Marx employed the method, quite independently, in psychology and social science. There is a chapter on ethics which offers a definition of the good and attempts to indicate that the definition is made possible by an extension of the methods of science. In the concluding chapter, the author presents a brief, but interesting, description of the purposes and activities of the Institute of Experimental Method.

The revolutionary method that has lately been emerging in the several sciences is described as "the method of dealing with a society of trends in which

the fate of the individual element is not the point at issue." Unlike classical mechanics, it does not aim to predict the behavior of individual elements, nor does it seek to establish invariant laws. The kind of laws it does seek to establish are those of a statistical, rather than a causal, nature.

When Mr. Schanck cites Gibbs as one of those scientists who rationalized "an entirely new approach to complex systems which cannot be treated mechanically," he seems to imply that the systems of thermodynamics and mechanics are different and that those of the former cannot be treated mechanically owing to their complexity. Neither view is correct, as the author himself appears elsewhere to recognize.

Since the observables of thermodynamics are properties of aggregates, and not of mass points or rigid bodies, which cannot be said to have a temperature, or an entropy, etc., the laws of thermodynamics do not predict the behavior, i.e., the position of momenta, of the molecules composing, say, a given volume of gas. On the other hand, the thermodynamic behavior of a substance can be predicted from a knowledge of its molecular properties, and it is precisely Gibbs' theory of statistical mechanics that makes this possible.

Mr. Schanck rightly observes that the reduction of thermodynamics to mechanics affects neither the truth nor the rigor of thermodynamic laws. This very observation suggests that what recommends them, or any other laws, is not so much the particular method they are supposed to exemplify as their ability to explain the kind of phenomena they are intended to explain. Whether scientific laws are considered mechanistic or non-mechanistic, whether they are thought of as treating individuals or groups, or whether they are causal or statistical, would seem to make no crucial difference.

B. A. RICHARDS

Yale University

*For A Science of Social Man: Convergences in Anthropology, Psychology, and Sociology.* Edited by JOHN GILLIN. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1954, viii, 289 pp. \$4.00.

The subtitle describes the main content provided by the book's six contributors, the title — the goal envisaged by the editor. Gillin has sought to "bring to light certain agreements and convergences, especially in theory, among these sister disciplines and to point to promising possibilities that will . . . contribute

to the further development of a science of social man."

To this end two distinguished authorities from each of the three disciplines have been asked to assess, respectively, the impact of one of the other two disciplines upon his own, emphasizing conceptual interpenetrations and possibilities for further synthesis. Thus, Becker and Parsons consider, respectively, the interrelations of anthropology and psychology with sociology, Hallowell and Murdock—psychology and sociology with anthropology, and Newcomb and Smith—sociology and anthropology with psychology.

On one level the book brings to a focus the recent "interdisciplinary" agitation. Despite notable lack of integration between the schools and factions within their own disciplines, many social scientists seem "hell-bent for integration" on the wider, cross-disciplinary, level of a science of social man. The book seeks to prepare the ground for this next advance.

On another level the work of the contributors stands on its own as a timely and valuable survey of interdisciplinary cross-fertilization to date. An enormous range of material has been admirably condensed into a small volume. For instance, Becker superbly marshals not only the history of the cross-fertilization between anthropology and sociology but follows its differential paths in four countries. On this level an indispensable handbook has been provided.

In the editor's scheme this is preparation for the noble goal of the unified science of man for which he pleads. Although his focus is upon theory, his admitted concern is with the urgent need for a valid body of knowledge of social man for the solution of man's pressing social problems.

Here, however, there are basic questions that are not faced up to. Availability of knowledge does not guarantee it will be used. It could well be held if only a fraction of the knowledge already gained by the social sciences, separately or collectively, were put to intelligent use man might not be in quite so parlous a state.

An even more disturbing consideration is not faced. Availability of knowledge for use does not insure it will be used wisely. If nuclear physicists are not today the happiest of men it is not due to society's failure to utilize their knowledge. Suppose the unified science so devoutly wished for is possible and a reliable body of knowledge of man yielding a high degree of prediction and control could be achieved by, shall we say, 1984. How

certain can anyone be that social scientists would have cause to rejoice?

ADOLPH S. TOMARS

*The City College of New York*

*Out of Wedlock.* By LEONTINE YOUNG. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954. x, 261 pp. \$4.00; *The Jealous Child.* By EDWARD PODOLSKY. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. ix, 147 pp. \$3.75.

Leontine Young, Professor of Casework in the School of Social Administration at Ohio State University has written the first full-length study of unwed mothers, their parents, their children, and their "affairs," in her book, *Out of Wedlock*.

As a caseworker who delves deeply into the underlying dynamics of behavior, Miss Young finds that the girl who "gets into trouble" as an unmarried mother usually wants to have a baby without being married.

In tracing how the unmarried mother comes to take the step that brings her a baby out of wedlock, Miss Young finds two major groupings: "the mother-ridden," in which the girl has grown up under the influence of a dominating mother; and "the father-ridden," in which the girl reacts to the tyrannical, sometimes abusive, behavior of her father. Other types of unwed mothers seem to this reviewer to be but variations on this major thesis of the book.

Part II takes up the problems of the unmarried father, but he never comes into focus as clearly as does the unmarried mother. To the end of the section, he remains as hazy a figure as he does in our culture at large.

Part III, on *The Illegitimate Child*, is an excellent statement of the best thinking in social casework on the care and placement of children born out of wedlock.

There is a comprehensive bibliography, a good index, and a postscript by Dr. Robert Fliess, psychoanalyst. All in all this book commends the attention not only of other caseworkers and fellow travelers, but also of any professional person who is interested in children, young people, and the dynamics of family interaction. In a real sense, this is not just another book, but a ground-breaker in a rough and rocky field that few before have explored.

*The Jealous Child* by Edward Podolsky, M. D., Department of Psychiatry, Kings County Hospital, Brooklyn, New York, is a little book generalizing in some twenty-five chapters, many of which are but a few pages long, on some of the

factors related to jealousy in children. It might be provocative for a beginning student in human behavior. There is a bibliography, but no index.

EVELYN MILLIS DUVAL

*Chicago, Illinois*  
*Sociological Perspective; Basic Concepts and Their Application.* By ELY CHINOV. Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1954. iv, 59 pp. \$3.85.

This is the second in the Doubleday Short Studies in Sociology series, "some twenty of which are now in preparation." Editor Charles H. Page calls this "an introduction to important fundamentals" of sociology.

There are six chapters. The first on "The Nature of Concepts" includes a defense of sociological "jargon," a discussion of semantics, a statement on the generalizing character of sociology, and a view of concepts in a science as instruments that direct observation and provide a point of view. Chapter II on "Culture" shows how culture is learned in social interaction. Institutions, folkways, mores, race, and kindred items contained in typical introductory texts are briefly described. Chapter III on "Society" states that "Society is that group within which men can share a total common life . . ." and utilizes MacIver's "web of social relationships." Chapter IV on "Social Groups" points out types of groups and societies, mentioning contributions of Maine, Spencer, Tönnies, Durkheim, Cooley, Redfield, and Howard Becker. Chapter V on "Function and Change" is based largely upon Merton's "manifest and latent functions," showing how dysfunction issuing from latent functions of social structures comprises a major source of social change. Chapter VI on "Society, Culture, and the Individual" examines the extent to which personality is a precipitate of culture and social interaction.

"Roles . . . can be analyzed separately" (p. 24). I doubt it. Try to analyze the role of teacher separate from pupil, or of husband apart from wife, or of leader apart from followers. Says Chinov, "American culture . . . represents an amalgamation [sic] of contributions from diverse groups" (p. 45). Cooley coined the term "secondary group" (p. 50). Did he?

A reading of this little booklet should do beginning students no harm. But the claim of Editor Page that it "may be used to replace standard textbook assignments" does not seem substantiated.

PHILIP J. ALLEN

*Mary Washington College of the University of Virginia*



## PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

Listing of a publication below does not preclude its being reviewed in a subsequent issue of SOCIAL PROBLEMS.

- ALMOND, GABRIEL A. *The Appeals of Communism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954. xix, 415 pp. \$6.00.
- BANKS, J. A. *Prosperity and Parenthood*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1954. v, 240 pp. \$4.50.
- BERNARD, JESSIE and DEBORAH MACLURG JENSEN. *Sociology*. St. Louis: The C. V. Mosby Company, 1954. 427 pp. \$5.00.
- BLAUSTEIN, ALBERT P. and CHARLES O. PORTER. *The American Lawyer*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. xiii, 360 pp. \$5.50.
- DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE. *Final Report on California Sexual Deviation Research*. Sacramento: Assembly of the State of California, 1954. 160 pp. No price indicated.
- GROSS, FELIX. *Foreign Policy Analysis*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. xiii, 179 pp. \$3.75.
- HARRIS, RICHARD E. *Delinquency In Our Democracy*. Los Angeles: Wetzel Publishing Co., 1954. 160 pp. \$3.50.
- HILL, REUBEN, J. JOEL MOSS, and CLAUDINE G. WIRTHS. *Eddyville's Families*. Chapel Hill: Institute for Research in Social Science, 1953. 442 pp. (Mimeographed). No price indicated.
- HINKLE, ROSCOE C., JR. and GISELA J. HINKLE. *The Development of Modern Sociology*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1954. x, 75 pp. \$0.95.
- HODGSON, KENNETH W. *The Deaf and Their Problems*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. xvii, 364 pp. \$6.00.
- JAHN, RAYMOND. *Tobacco Dictionary*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. 199 pp. \$5.00.
- JEFFERYS, MARGOT. *Mobility in the Labour Market*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1954. ix, 160 pp. \$3.50.
- JESSUP, FRANK W. (Editor). *Adult Education Towards Social and Political Responsibility*. Hamburg: Unesco Institute for Education, 1953. 143 pp. \$0.75.
- KAMIAT, ARNOLD H. *The Ethics of Civilization*. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1954. vi, 80 pp. \$2.00.
- KEVE, PAUL W. *Prison, Probation or Parole?* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954. 257 pp. \$3.75.
- KORNHAUSER, ARTHUR, ROBERT DUBIN, and ARTHUR M. ROSS (Editors). *Industrial Conflict*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1954. 551 pp. \$6.00.
- THE MARTIN ZETHFIELD PROGRAM. *Lotteries-for-Housing*. New York: The William Frederick Press, 1954. 26 pp. \$1.00.
- MATTHEWS, DONALD R. *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1954. viii, 71 pp. \$0.95.
- MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND. *The Interrelations of Demographic, Economic, and Social Problems in Selected Underdeveloped Areas*. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1954. 200 pp. \$1.00.
- NOTTINGHAM, ELIZABETH K. *Religion and Society*. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954. x, 84 pp. \$0.95.
- ROEDER, WILLIAM S. (Compiler). *Dictionary of European History*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. viii, 316 pp. \$6.00.
- ROGERS, CARL R. and ROSALIND F. DYMOND (Editors). *Psychotherapy and Personality Change*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. x, 446 pp. \$6.00.
- RUSSELL, LORD OF LIVERPOOL. *The Scourge of the Swastika*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. xii, 259 pp. \$4.50.
- SMITH, CHARLES R. *The Mind and the Universe*. New York: The William Frederick Press, 1954. 173 pp. \$3.50.
- STALLINGS, HAROLD L. and DAVID DRESSLER. *Juvenile Officer*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1954. viii, 247 pp. \$3.00.
- STANTON, ALFRED H. and MORRIS S. SCHWARTZ. *The Mental Hospital*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1954. xiii, 492 pp. \$7.50.
- SWABEY, MARIE COLLINS. *The Judgment of History*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. x, 257 pp. \$3.75.
- UNITED NATIONS. *Catalogue of Economic and Social Projects of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies*. New York: United Nations, 1954. viii, 157 pp. \$1.75.
- WASHBURN, NORMAN F. *Interpreting Social Change in America*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1954. xiii, 50 pp. \$0.95.
- WINTER, CARL G. *American Influence on Canadian Nationhood*. Washington: Public Affairs, 1954. 23 pp. No price indicated.
- ZETTERING, HANS L. *On Theory and Verification in Sociology*. New York: Tressler Press, 1954. 78 pp. \$2.50.

## OFFICIAL REPORTS

### REPORT BY THE EDITOR OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS TO THE FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS, SEPTEMBER 11, 1954

I regret very much that I am unable to give this report in person because I believe that the most valuable aspect of this session will be your suggestions to the Editorial Staff for the future of our journal. At the end of my brief remarks, therefore, I hope time will be available for comments and that someone will record them so that they can be conveyed to me and to the other members of the Editorial Staff.

In the course of publishing the four issues of Volume 1 and the first issue of Volume 2, we have gradually and experimentally developed an editorial policy. This has involved a number of decisions regarding the major emphases of our journal. I shall list these tentative decisions so that you can tell us whether or not you approve of the direction or directions in which we are going. But first, I want to make it clear that each emphasis means only a central tendency in the frequency distribution of our articles and I should oppose an editorial policy so rigid as to exclude all deviations.

Many decisions were obviously dictated by economic necessity. Since our poverty limited our first few issues to forty pages, we insisted on very short articles. While there is virtue in the necessity to make our authors state their point as succinctly as possible, I think some of our early manuscripts were too much condensed and abridged. Now that we are able to publish a sixty page journal, our articles tend to be somewhat longer, most of them ranging from 3,000 to 5,000 words. As we grow richer and fatter, I suggest that we publish more rather than still longer articles and that we should very rarely allow a manuscript to exceed 6,000 words.

In subject-matter we have been permissive without being promiscuous. We have viewed our jurisdiction as embracing the following areas: 1. the field of social problems as usually defined by sociologists; 2. organizations, institutions, or movements which deal with social problems; 3. the application of social science research to the formulation of social policies; 4. the institutional areas (such as

family, class, ethnic group, war, bureaucracy, mass communications) which most concern problem-oriented social scientists; 5. trends affecting the opportunities, working conditions, ethics and freedoms of social scientists; and 6. theories and methods in the study of these phenomena. We have tended to exclude manuscripts dealing with general sociological theory or with research methodology unrelated to problem areas or with highly specialized descriptive accounts of ameliorative procedures such as the treatment of alcoholics in a county jail or the setting up of a mental health project in a housing project. Although these are obviously important topics, we felt that they were inappropriate for our journal and could be more suitably published elsewhere. It would be helpful to us to know whether you consider this general formula too inclusive or too exclusive and also whether you believe that we have either overplayed or underplayed any specific topics. It should be realized, of course, that our choice of subject-matter is, despite our frequent solicitation of manuscripts, limited to a considerable extent by the manuscripts which are available at the deadline date for any particular issue. With the increased volume and variety of manuscripts which we are receiving, this constraint is becoming less important.

In regard to the author's approach to his subject-matter, we have favored those writers who submit to us articles which relate data to significant hypotheses rather than those who present pure description. We welcome theoretical innovation, but discourage vague speculation or the mere coining of new words for old concepts.

As a general rule, we have tried to avoid articles which moralize, exhort, praise, or blame. We have conceived of our publication as a journal devoted to knowledge rather than opinion; to truth-judgments rather than value-judgments. We have however, permitted certain exceptions in articles dealing with the professional problems of social scientists. Perhaps in this area an occasional affirmation of values is desirable. Several writers did this in our special feature issue of last January on FREEDOMS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF SOCIAL SCIENTISTS. Discussion of this question of policy by members of the Society would be particularly helpful to us.

Thus far we have had two symposium issues, the one just mentioned and the

one on the Kinsey Report, and we have had three multi-topic issues. Over two thousand copies of the Kinsey issue were sold and, as you know, a much expanded version of this issue is being published in book form for the Society by W. W. Norton under the title **SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN HUMAN SOCIETY**. While we welcome suggestions for future symposia, I think we should resist the pressure to have more than two single-topic issues per year.

In regard to single-topic issues, we sometimes receive suggestions that we appoint a special "Issue Editor" to edit a number of the journal devoted to a topic in which he has special competence. My personal opinion, based on observation of other journals, is that this policy is dangerous. Quality and consistency are likely to be sacrificed when the editor turns over the job to others. And, even if this does not happen in a particular instance, once we have set the precedent, it will be extremely difficult to resist the pressure to appoint a large number of Issue Editors in the future. Furthermore, we feel that it would be unfair to appoint an Issue Editor and not to give him complete responsibility for the particular issue. Perhaps, however, we can utilize the special competences among our members without risking these dangers if, instead of appointing an "Issue Editor," we occasionally designate a "Consulting Editor for this Issue" and at the same time make it clear that editorial responsibility for the issue continues to rest with the editor.

In regard to style, we have striven hard for simple clear English comprehensible to our increasing number of non-academic readers. I should like to hear from you how well you believe we have succeeded in this aim. Technical terms should, in our opinion, be used only when they are essential for precise communication.

We are proud to have been the vehicle for the first publications of a number of young scholars and also to have included the writings of men and women of international repute. Moreover, we have been absolutely impartial in rejecting manuscripts submitted by authors in both of these categories.

To summarize what I have said, we have made tentative policy decisions in regard to length of article, subject-matter, analysis vs. description, value-judgments, single-topic vs. multi-topic issues, issue editors. The Editorial Staff would appreciate both oral and written comments regarding these decisions.

A happy development has been the

Helen L. DeRoy Award of \$500 for Research and Writing in the Field of Social Problems made possible by the generosity of the Helen L. DeRoy Foundation of Detroit. Since many contestants will (we have reason to expect) submit manuscripts for publication in **SOCIAL PROBLEMS**, this contest should enhance the quality and quantity of manuscripts submitted to us. I hope you will publicize this award among your colleagues and students and also send us your own manuscripts for the contest. The Award will be presented at the next annual meeting of the Society.

Finances continue to be our most pressing problem. By dint of all sorts of imaginable and unimaginable economies; an enormous amount of volunteer clerical labor by staff members, their spouses and friends; donations; increasing memberships, subscriptions, and sales; we have managed to survive. I have no doubt that we shall continue to survive and grow. We shall, however, continue to need the heartening support which you have been giving us. Your work in getting subscriptions from your libraries, colleagues, and students; in contributing and soliciting manuscripts; and in offering editorial suggestions has been indispensable. To produce the kind of journal which the Society deserves, we shall need all of these efforts during the coming year.

Since this is a personal report, I shall take the liberty of acknowledging the magnificent cooperation of the members of the Editorial Staff: Sylvia Fleis Fava, who has shared with me the main editorial burden; Samuel Koenig, the Book Review Editor; Sidney H. Aronson, our magician-business manager without whose prodigious labors we would have long ago perished; and Nathan L. Gerard, our extremely competent Advertising Manager. I must also mention Al Lee, who in so many ways has been Godfather and gadfly to this Journal. Finally, the Advisory Editors and the members of the Editorial and Publications Committee have been most helpful. I hope the members of the new Publications Committee will not hesitate to let us know how they would like to participate in the work of the Journal.

Ultimately, the fate of **SOCIAL PROBLEMS** depends upon the membership of the Society. We are aware of many of our shortcomings and trust that you will make us aware of more. With your help, however, we are confident that we can produce a Journal which in quality will be second to none among American scholarly periodicals.

# ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1953-54 OF THE EDITORIAL AND PUBLICATIONS COMMITTEE

1. Two books of readings are in process of being published for the Society by W. W. Norton Company. All royalties from the sale of these books will go to the Society, and members are urged to encourage their sale. They will both be published during the next few months:

- a. *Mental Health and Mental Disorder: A Sociological Approach*. Edited by Arnold M. Rose.
- b. *Sexual Behavior in American Society: An Appraisal of the First Two Kinsey Reports*. Edited by Jerome Himelhoch and Sylvia Fleis Fava.

The only journal to charge us for reprinting rights—in spite of strong protests on our part—was *Psychiatry*. Since the American Sociological Society is contemplating charging for rights to reprint articles from the *Review*, the committee has requested the Executive Committee of ASS to exempt the SSSP and other nonprofit learned societies from such charges.

2. The committee would welcome suggestions for other symposia and books of readings that might be used as texts, as well as offers to serve as editors of such books. Suggestions should be made to Prof. Hornell Hart, the new chairman of the committee.

3. The committee wishes to express the Society's appreciation for the splendid work in building up our journal, *SOCIAL PROBLEMS*, to Editor Jerome Himelhoch and his assistants, Sidney Aronson, Sylvia Fleis Fava, Nathan Gerrard, and Samuel Koenig.

## Signed:

Lowry Nelson, Chairman  
Hornell Hart  
Samuel Koenig  
Elizabeth Briant Lee  
Arnold M. Rose, Acting Chairman

The Editorial Staff accepts with regret the resignation of Dr. Nathan Gerrard as Associate Editor, necessitated by his move to the University of Miami. Dr. Gerrard was in charge of advertising and publicity, a post which requires residence in the New York City area.

# COMMITTEE APPOINTMENTS 1954-1955

## Chairmen, Regular Committees:

- Rose Hum Lee, *Roosevelt University*, Committee on Author-Publisher Relations;  
Alfred McClung Lee, *Brooklyn College*, New Projects Committee;  
A. Raymond Mangus, *Ohio State University*, Program Committee;  
James B. McKee, *University of Toledo*, Membership Committee;  
Harry W. Roberts, *Virginia State College*, Elections Committee;  
Arnold M. Rose, *University of Minnesota*, Committee on Liaison with other organizations;  
Jerome Skolnick, *Yale University*, Committee on Student Participation.

## Chairmen, Special Problems Committees:

- Sevryn T. Bruyn, *Illinois College, Jacksonville, Illinois*, Community Research and Development;  
Dean G. Epley, *Memphis State College*, Invidious Intergroup Relations;  
Sherwood D. Fox, *Skidmore College*, Social Science and Social Policy;  
E. Gartly Jaco, *University of Texas, Austin*, Mental Health;  
Samuel H. Leger, *George Pepperdine College, Los Angeles*, Large Group Dynamics;  
Arthur E. Prell, *University of New Hampshire*, Social Disorganization and Disintegration;  
John A. Rademaker, *Willamette University*, Conditions for Democracy and Science.

# NOTICE OF 1955 ANNUAL MEETING

The SSSP will hold its annual meeting in Washington, D.C., August 30, 1955 through September 2. Arrangements are being made to hold a number of joint sessions with the American Sociological Society, which is also meeting in Washington, D. C. during this period. Members of SSSP are invited to submit suggestions for the 1955 annual program to Professor A. Raymond Mangus, Department of Sociology, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.

# NOTICE OF JOINT MEETING OF SSSP AND SPSSI

The SSSP and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues will

hold their third annual joint meeting at the Henry Hudson Hotel in New York City, February 26-27, 1955. The program committee includes: Robert Bierstedt, City College of New York, Chairman; Henry Meyer, New York University; Sylvia F. Fava, Harold M. Proshansky, and Evelyn Raskin, all of Brooklyn College. The program will include sessions on the following four topics: Desegregation; Community and Individual Problem; Security, Loyalty and Individual Freedom; Mental Health & the Community; the American Indian; Autonomy or Assimilation. There will be a dinner meeting on Saturday evening, with Dr. Frank Graham speaking on the topic, "Mediation in International Affairs."

#### AFFILIATION OF SSSP WITH THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

The SSSP has been informed by John W. Riley, Jr., Secretary of the American Sociological Society, that a resolution to affiliate the Society for the Study of Social Problems with the American Sociological Society was approved this summer by a clear majority of ASS members. One consequence of affiliation is that the SSSP will have a representative on the Council of the ASS. The SSSP is happy to be affiliated with the ASS and hopes that the association will be long and mutually profitable.

## NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

**The Conference on Jewish Relations** invites its members and all interested social scientists, including students in the social sciences, to a Conference on *American Jewish Sociology*, on Saturday evening, November 27th and all day Sunday, November 28th, at the Hotel Commodore in New York City. There will be three round table sessions and a luncheon meeting in which a number of social scientists and community leaders are scheduled to participate. The topics of the session are: *Forms and Expressions of Jewish Identification* (The Psychology of Belonging); *The Changing Structure of the Jewish Community* (Patterns of Leadership and Participation); *Jews and Their Neighbors* (Majority-Minority Interaction in America) and *Support for Jewish Cultural Research* (Aims and Plans of the Conference on Jewish Relations). For a complete program and further information, write to the Conference on Jewish Relations, Inc., 1841 Broadway, New York 23, N.Y.

**The Eastern Sociological Society** announces that the annual meeting of the Society has been scheduled for April 2 and 3 in New York City. A program and details on reservations will be forwarded to members at a later date. This meeting will celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Society. Accordingly, President Alfred McClung Lee and the Executive Committee are planning some special features for the program. The

Committee on Papers invites members of the Society and others who may be interested to submit papers for the annual meeting. Papers will be accepted in any relevant field of sociology, whether concerned with research, methodology, theory, statistics or other topics of interest to professional sociologists. A large part of the program will be reserved for such contributions and it is hoped that a wide range of subjects may be represented. In order that preliminary plans may be made it is requested that anyone intending to present a paper notify the chairman of the committee by December 15th, indicating the probable title and nature of his paper. The final date for submission of papers is January 15th, 1955. If it is not possible to provide a completed paper by this date a preliminary draft may be substituted. Papers should be limited to about fifteen minutes of oral presentation. All papers will receive careful consideration. If a paper is not accepted for presentation at a section meeting but is of apparent professional interest it will be listed by title on the program. The author of such a paper may distribute mimeographed copies to interested persons at the meeting. The member of the Committee on Papers are Paul F. Cressy, J. Henry Korson, Albert Morris, Vincent H. Whitney. All papers and correspondence should be sent to the chairman, Paul F. Cressy, Wheaton College, Norton, Mass.



The Interamerican Society of Psychology invites its members to attend the Second Interamerican Congress of Psychology will be held at University City, Mexico, December 14-19, 1954. The Congress is sponsored by the ISP, the Mexican Department of Education, and the National University of Mexico. The central theme of the Congress will be *Psychology of Education*, from the aspects of Applied Psychology, Psychotherapy, Social Anthropology and Teaching. A limited number of guest accommodations will be available at the University, and a larger number at special convention rates at nearby hotels. You are urged to apply for membership immediately if you wish to participate in this Congress. To secure further information or to apply for membership send a curriculum vitae in triplicate to: Werner Wolff, Secretary-General ISP, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York.

Roosevelt University, is the new name of Roosevelt College of Chicago, effective on September 1, 1954, the beginning of its tenth academic year. Since it was chartered in 1945, Roosevelt has had a university-type of organization.

Rose Hum Lee (Mrs. Glenn Ginn) contributed the Introductory and China chapters to the second volume of Stackpole Press' *Contemporary Social Sciences*, published in the fall of 1954. Her textbook, *The City: Urbanism and Urbanization in Major World Regions*, will bear the 1955 copyright date.

St. Clair Drake taught at the University of Liberia in Monrovia in the spring of 1954. For 1954-5, he has a Ford fellowship for research in Africa and is spending the fall in Accra, Gold Coast.

Robert E. T. Roberts is teaching part-time, with the rank of Assistant Professor. He is responsible for courses in anthropology in the absence of Mr. Drake.

Dan C. Lortie taught during the 1954 summer session.

Arthur Hillman, department chairman, is directing a demonstration adult education program for recent immigrants, supported by the Schwarzhaupt Foundation. An Italian edition of his *Community Organization and Planning*, has been published in Milan.

The University of Kentucky Press announces the establishment of a fellowship awarding \$5,000 to the writer who displays the most insight and scholarship in projecting a book-length manuscript analyzing some significant aspect of the culture of Kentucky or its region. When completed, the book will be published by

the Press. Applicants will be asked to submit a 25-page essay on their subject; from this and from interviews the Press Fellowship Committee will choose the winner. Up to \$4,000 will be paid as a stipend while the candidate is completing his manuscript. The remainder of the \$5,000, will be paid upon submission of the book to the Press in an acceptable, publishable form. Deadline for application for the University of Kentucky Press Fellowship will be April 1, 1955. Further information may be obtained by writing the University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, Kentucky.

University of North Dakota. A Social Science Research Institute has been established with the purpose "to stimulate, sponsor, and direct research in the social sciences, particularly pertaining to North Dakota and the Great Plains." The Institute is governed by a Director and a Board representing the five social science departments: economics, geography, history, political science, and sociology-anthropology. A grant has been received from a private Midwestern foundation in support of a research project: "Economic and social impacts of oil developments in the area of Williston, North Dakota." The project is in progress with a team of University staff members and several assistants working in the field last summer. Other projects are in the planning stage.

Peter A. Munch, head of the department of sociology and anthropology, has been appointed director of the newly established Social Science Research Institute.

Robert B. Campbell has been promoted to assistant professor of sociology. During the summer he was engaged in research under the auspices of the Social Science Research Institute (the Williston project.) He is a member of the board of the Institute.

In this division of social work there are two new staff members: Ole Omlid, assistant professor of social work, and Mrs. Ione Olson, assistant professor of occupational therapy.

The University of South Dakota announces with regret the death on Thanksgiving Eve, 1953 of Forrest L. Weller, chairman of the Department of Sociology. Dr. Weller received his Ph. D. from the University of Chicago and wrote his doctoral dissertation on the Mennonites. In recent years he specialized in the study of the family and is the author of a book dealing with the family which is scheduled for early publication.

## COMMUNICATIONS AND OPINIONS

### THREATS TO PROGRESS: ANTI-INTELLECTUAL TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY U. S. A.

#### To the Editor:

I am herewith proposing a book-length symposium on anti-intellectualism to be editorially sponsored perhaps by the Society for the Study of Social Problems. The efforts would be to get contributions from a variety of fields. Suggestions as to topics, issues, general orientations, contributions, etc. would be much appreciated.

Some contributions might require special funds to underwrite original research: the possibilities of foundation support would have to be considered (such projects might be co-sponsored by interested organizations like AAUP).

The basic emphases should be at least:

- (1) Clarification of the links between assaults on intellectual activity and the general attack on civil liberties in present-day U. S. A.
- (2) Where and how can anti-intellectualism be counteracted?
- (3) What are the present-day responsibilities of intellectuals and their organizations?
- (4) What can be done to develop a long-run perspective that improves the role and strengthens the activity of intellectuals?

#### I. THE CHARACTER OF ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM

- A. *Who are the Intellectuals?* People not directly involved in "practical" activity? Anti-intellectualism has broad focus  
Character and role of American intellectuals  
Their role (economic, political, social) in American society
- B. *The Character of Anti-Intellectualism*  
How does one spot an anti-intellectual attack?  
Case-studies of such attacks  
The image of the intellectual—the separation of affect and competence. The self-image of the intellectual. (Might require attitudinal survey: see H.)  
The mass media, popular culture, plays, novels, as purveyors of predispositions to anti-intellectualism.
- C. *The Social Role of Anti-Intellectualism?*  
Links with general assault on civil

right in the U. S.

Social change and the intellectual  
Anti-Semitism and the intellectual?

- D. *The Debasement of Intellectual Activity in the U. S. A. and its Contribution to Anti-Intellectualism*  
Debasement of symbols, from communist to liberal

American culture and anti-intellectualism — television, comic strips, leisure as alienation from life  
Misunderstand nature of science — of role of controversy in science  
The growth in technicianism and the sale of science

- E. *The Historical Roots of Anti-Intellectualism*  
Attitudes towards academic freedom. Attitudes towards intellectual activity in U.S.A. A know-nothing movement is not new in our country.
- F. *Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism in Other Countries*  
A comparative study of the role of the intellectual and of his economic, social and political position.
- G. *The Dangers of Anti-Intellectualism*  
What happens to a society that has such tendencies? Comparative Data. Connection with civil rights generally.

#### II. THE SUPPORT OF PRESENT-DAY ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM

##### H. *Attitudes Toward Anti-Intellectualism*

The mass base (size, corporation, sex, region, class, rural-urban, occupation,<sup>a</sup> political affiliation, participant-non-participant, attitude, intensity). To what extent linked with authoritarianism, ignorance and misinformation. What is the fulcrum of the anti-intellectual perspective (the immediacy of communism; the ineffectualness of science, etc.) Also impact of particular situation. How fluid is the attitude?

(This section would require (1) secondary analysis of existing opinion poll data, similar to H. H. Human's analysis of attitudes toward academic freedom in *Journal of Social Issues* and (2) new attitudinal surveys requiring funds. Would it be possible to get support from Fund for the Republic, or some such organization for a particular researcher or group of researchers?)

- I. *The Organization of Anti-Intellectual Movements*  
To what ends is anti-intellectualism organized? On what issues? Where? How did organization grow, i.e. What issues, events led to the organizing of such sentiments? What kind of behavior is exhibited? The public school attacks, the attack on books and textbooks.
  - J. *The Leadership of Anti-Intellectual Movements*  
The agitators. Who are they? Personal and social background. Nature of appeals—psychological and social roots?  
Behind the scenes — Where does money and propaganda support come from? Why?
  - K. *Political Machinery and Anti-Intellectualism*  
How are governments (local, state and federal) used to further anti-intellectualism?
- III. THE EFFECTS OF PRESENT ANTI-INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENTS
- L. *On the public school system*
  - M. *On the colleges (need for field study)*
  - N. *In the arts*
- IV. THE RESISTANCE TO ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM
- O. *Personal Attitudes and Social Values* contrary to anti-intellectualism that might be encouraged.
  - P. *A Case History of a Successful Defense of Intellectual Life* (Detroit and Jenner Committee?)
  - Q. *Lessons from the California Case*
  - R. *The Resistance Organizations*  
How effective are they in (1) changing opinions, (2) neutralizing the effects of these opinions.  
A critical view of the structure and policies of resistance organization (AAUP; ACLA; etc.).
  - S. *A Program for Fighting Back;*  
Role of Individual Intellectual  
Change opinions  
Neutralize opinions  
Understanding the attackers and the nature of attack  
Enlisting the support of community organization—and those not now seeing the dangers (like the AJC)  
The ideology and policies necessary for a successful defense and an emergence of a positive role for intellectuals in American society  
The structure necessary for a successful defense at this time.  
Long term perspectives.

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